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Moeflich Hasbullah

Cultural Presentation of the Muslim Middle Class in Contemporary Indonesia

Abstraksi: *Dekade 1990-an merupakan satu periode penting dalam perkembangan Islam Indonesia masa Orde Baru. Kemajuan pembangunan oleh pemerintah, khususnya di bidang pendidikan, telah meratakan jalan bagi proses mobilisasi vertikal sebagian Muslim, khususnya kaum santri, yang sebelumnya mengalami marginalisasi baik secara sosial maupun politik. Mereka mengalami transformasi dari masyarakat agraris tradisional —sawah* society*—menjadi masyarakat urban yang sarat dengan nilai dan pola kehidupan modern.*

Pada dekade tersebut Islam Indonesia menyaksikan munculnya apa yang disebut "kelas menengah Muslim". Didorong kemajuan pembangunan pemerintah Orde Baru, sebagian kaum santri Indonesia tumbuh sebagai kelompok sosial terdidik yang menguasai berbagai keterampilan dunia modern: birokrasi pemerintahan, bisnis, jurnalistik, dan di sektor-sektor kehidupan lain. Kehadiran kelas menengah Muslim ini menandai satu tahapan penting dalam perkembangan Islam Indonesia kontemporer. Mereka tidak saja menghadirkan corak kehidupan keagamaan yang terintegrasi dengan modernitas, tetapi juga —ini yang terpenting—menawarkan corak keislaman yang bisa diterima politik Orde Baru.

Hal demikian berlangsung karena kelas menengah Muslim —berbeda dari santri lama yang berorientasi pada gerakan politik—lebih memilih ranah kultural sebagai agenda utama gerakan mereka. Dalam gerakan terakhir ini, modernisasi pendidikan dan institusi Islam, rasionalisasi pemikiran keagamaan, dan pemberdayaan masyarakat, memperoleh perhatian utama. Sejalan dengan itu, intelektual Muslim pada dekade ini menawarkan pola keagamaan modern dan inklusif, yang menekankan nilai-nilai universal ajaran Islam —keadilan, kesetaraan, dan isu-isu keagamaan lain yang sejalan dengan prinsip-prinsip modernitas. Gerakan kultural ini mampu menawarkan pola keislaman yang sesuai dengan kehidupan perkotaan. Sehingga, dalam

konteks inilah, fenomena intensifikasi Islam, atau apa yang seringkali disebut "santrinisasi" bisa dijelaskan. Kehadiran kelas menengah Muslim tidak saja menandai berakhirnya trikotomi santri, abangan, dan priyayi—sebagaimana dipopulerkan Clifford Geertz—tapi juga berbuah pada proses intensifikasi keislaman Muslim Indonesia.

Artikel ini menghadirkan satu kajian tentang kelas menengah Muslim Indonesia masa Orde Baru tersebut. Fokus pembahasan terutama diarahkan pada apa yang disebut sebagai "presentasi budaya" suatu masyarakat yang terkategori sebagai kelas menengah. Representasi budaya ini, penting ditegaskan, tampak telah berperan—mengutip Pierre Bourdieu—sebagai 'habitus', yaitu kode-kode kelas yang menyatukan perilaku, ideologi dan identitas. Kode-kode ini—berupa pakaian, bahasa, ideologi, agama, ekonomi, cita rasa atau estetika—berfungsi sebagai simbol-simbol yang menyatukan dan membentuk sebuah kelas sosial. Ia secara sosial menunjukkan terbentuknya sebuah kelas dalam suatu masyarakat.

Dalam kaitan ini, terdapat setidaknya lima presentasi budaya yang bisa diidentifikasi, yang berkembang bersamaan dengan tampilnya kelas menengah Muslim. Pertama, fenomena merebaknya jilbab. Bermula dari kampus, pemakaian jibab menyebar ke kalangan kelas menengah. Jilbab berfungsi tidak hanya sebagai simbol kesetiaan keagamaan, tapi lebih dari itu sebagai simbol efektif dalam memenuhi kebutuhan psikologis dalam mengatasi problem dislokasi dan krisis identitas di tengah dunia modern. Kedua, munculnya lagu-lagu keagamaan, khususnya kasidah modern Bimbo. Seperti halnya fenomena jilbab, lagu-lagu keagamaan berkembang sebagai respon terhadap kuatnya arus musik sekuler yang kering dari sentuhan nilai-nilai spiritual.

Ketiga, terbentuknya Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI) yang berdiri pada 1990. Ledakan dan ekspansi kelompok santri terdidik ini, sebagaimana disinggung di atas, pada gilirannya memiliki dampak politik kuat yang berujung pada pendirian organisasi cendikiawan Muslim tersebut. Keempat, terbitnya berbagai media Islam modern di mana kelas menengah Muslim mengartikulasikan gagasan-gagasan intelektualnya. Jurnal 'Ulumul Qur'an *dan harian* Republika *adalah dua di antara sejumlah media Islam dengan beberapa ciri khas modern: profesional, liberal, dan, tentu saja, berorientasi modern.*

Kelima, menjamurnya gejala pengajian-pengajian kelompok elit. Sejak 1980-an, di Indonesia tumbuh subur pengajian-pengajian yang diselenggarakan di hotel-hotel berbintang, kantor-kantor swasta dan pemerintah serta di televisi, yang dihadiri umumnya oleh kaum profesional, pengusaha, para pejabat pemerintah, para artis dan mereka yang disebut sebagai kelas menengah Muslim.

Moeflich Hasbullah

Cultural Presentation of the Muslim Middle Class in Contemporary Indonesia

خلاصة: تعد التسعينات فترة هامة في تطور الإسلام بإندونيسيا من خلال نظام الحكم الجديد، فقد مهد الازدهار الذي حققته الحكومة خاصة في مجال التعليم الطريق أمام التوسع الإسلامي رأسيا، حيث شهد المسلمون وبالأخص الملتزمون منهم —الذين كانوا في السابق منعزلين اجتماعيا وسياسيا— تحولا من الوضع القروي المحافظ إلى الوضع المدني المتسم بالحياة العصرية الحديثة.

لقد شهد الإسلام بإندونيسيا في تلك الفترة ظهور ما يطلق عليه "الطبقة الوسطى" إذ كان نشوء بعض المسلمين التراثيين نتيجة التقدم والازدهار الذي حققته الحكومة على طبقة المثقفين ليصبح لديهم إلمام كاف بمختلف المؤلات الخاصة بالحياة العصرية، سواء في مجال الإدارة الحكومية أم الأعمال أم الصحافة أم في القاطاعت الأخرى من الحاية، وقد كان بروز هذه الطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين إيذانا بظهور مرحلة هامة في تاريخ الإسلام بإندونيسيا المعاصرة، إذ لم يأتوا بأنموذج للحياة الدينية المواكبة للتحديث فحسب، بل —وهذا هو الأهم— يعرضون الشريعة الإسلامية بحيث تستسيغها سياسة نظام الحكم الجديد.

والسبب في ذلك يرجع إلى أن الطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين خلافا للتراثيين القدامى ذوي الاتجاه السياسي يفضلون الجوانب الثقافية كإطار عام لحركتهم، حيث يولون الاهتمام الأول بتحديث نظام التعليم والمؤسسات الإسلامية، وتحكيم العقل وتفعيل المجتمع بما لديه من إمكانات، وكان يواكب ذلك ما قاموا به من تطبيق للتعاليم الدينية الحديثة بموقف أكثر تفتحا، فكانوا يركزون اهتمامهم على القيم الإسلامية العالمية مثل العدالة والمساواة وما إلى ذلك من أمور تتمشى مع المبادئ التحديثية، وفي وسع هذه الحركة الفكرية أن توفر للحياة العصرية من قيم إسلامية تتفق مع مقتضى الحياة في المدن.

ومن هنا يمكن توضيح ظاهرة الاتجاه الإسلامي المكثف التي كثيرا ما يطلق عليها ظاهرة الإسلام التراثي الطابع، فلم يكن بروز الطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين إيذانا فحسب بنهاية نظرية ثلاثية الطبقات الإسلامية بإندونيسيا من مسلم ملتزم ومسلم

بالاسم وطبيقة النبلاء —كما طرحه الباحث كليفورد جيرتز (Clifford Gertz)— إنما نجم عنه أيضا التوجه إلى مزيد من الالتزام بالشريعة الإسلامية.

وتأتي هذه المقالة بدراسة حول الطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين بإندونيسيا خلال فترة نظام الحكم الجديد، وكان البحث ينصب على ما يسمى بالحضور الثقافي لجماعة صنفت ضمن الطبقات الاجتماعية الوسطى، وهذا الحضور الثقافي بما له من أهمية كان يلعب فيما يبدو دور الرباط —على حد تعبير بوردو (Pierre Bourdieu)— أعني آداب تجمعهم وتميزهم في السلوك والعقيدة والهوية، فلباسهم وأسلوبهم في الكلام وممارستهم لعقيدتهم ودينهم وكذلك نظرتهم إلى الاقتصاد والتعبير عن الفن والجمال، كل ذلك يمثل مميزات تجمعهم وجعلتهم طبقة اجتماعية، إنها من الناحية الاجتماعية إيذانا بتكوين طبقة في المجتمع.

وفي هذا الصدد يلاحظ بوجود خمسة حضور ثقافي على الأقل كانت مواكبة لبروز الطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين:

أولها: انتشار ظاهرة التحجب، ابتداء من أوساط الجامعات إلى الطبقة الاجتماعية الوسطى، و لم يكن التحجب مجرد تطبيق لأهم التعاليم الدينية بل كان رمزا فعالا في توفية الحاجة نفسيا إلى التغلب على الإحساس بالانفصال وأزمة الهوية في خضم الحياة العصرية؛

وثانيها: انتشار الأغاني الدينية وخاصة فيما أداها فرقة بيمبو (Bimbo)، فكما كان التحجب كذلك الأغاني الدينية كانت استجابة لتغلغل الأغاني العلمانية الجافة المعزولة عن القيم الروحية؛

ثالثها: إنشاء رابطة المثقفين المسلمين بإندونيسيا (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se Indonesia/ICMI) سنة ١٩٩٠م، إن تفجر التراثيين المثقفين وتوسعهم كما سبقت الإشارة إليه كان له آثار سياسية انتهت بإنشاء هذه الرابطة؛

رابعها: ظهور وسائل الإعلامية الحديثة التي كانت خير عون للطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين أن ينشروا أفكارهم الجديدة، وكانت حولية *علوم القرآن* (*Ulumul Qur'an*) وصحيفة *ريبليكا* (*Republika*) من الوسائل الإعلامية الإسلامية التي تتمتع بالسمات المعاصرة من احتراف وتفتح واتجاه تحديثي بطبيعة الحال؛

خامسها: انتشار الحلقات الدينية لدى صفوة المجتمع، فابتداء من الثمانينات انتشرت الحلقات الدينية في الفنادق الكبرى وفي مكاتب القطاع الخاص والمصالح الحكومية والتليفزيون، تلك الحلقات التي يشترك فيها رجال الأعمار وكبار الدولة والفنانين وكذلك أولئك الذين أطلق عليه الطبقة الوسطى من المسلمين.

"It is as if the masses have kept a secret to themselves while the intellectuals keep running around in circles trying to make out what it is, what is going on."

Stuart Hall

One approach to understanding the platform of New Order politics is to view it as having been a contest between Indonesian political groups for access to power. Throughout the New Order period, economic capital was largely in the hands of a Chinese minority, while political capital was in the hands of the *abangan* Javanese *priyayi*.[1] At the same time, the *santri* (the 'true Muslims'), have been economically and politically marginalised. They have been, as Wertheim (1975) put it, "the outsiders". Since the 1980s, thanks to the success of development efforts, Indonesia has been undergoing rapid economic development and a massive educational transformation. These economic and educational transformations have increased the percapita income and standard of living, mostly in urban areas, and expanded the 'middle class.' For the urban Muslim community —which represent the bulk of those most affected by development — the economic and educational transformations have not only resulted in class transformation creating a 'middle rank', but also caused the mobilization of the decades-marginalised *santri* who have embraced the project of cultural Islam. Subsequently, the Muslim group –-represented by its urban middle class--has becoming a growing societal power relying on its "cultural capital" (Bourdieu 1984) to challenge the hegemony of the Javanese *priyayi*.

The most dramatic symbolic expression of the educated middle class was the establishment of ICMI (Muslim Association of Indonesian Intellectuals) in 1990, which brought Muslims to the power center. Due to its modern nature, ICMI became a symbol of modernity for the new class in which educated urban Muslims collectively placed their identities. Since the sources of identity take many forms, such as religion, class, language, and gender (Rao 1999: 56), from the 1980s onward the Muslim middle class began reinforcing its collective identity by way of other codes of class such as religious dress (the veil, head cover), music taste (e.g. Bimbo's modern *kasidah* or religious song, and *Kiayi Kanjeng*), language (modernist Islamic media) and fashion (the trend of the elite's prestigious religious teaching). This study shows that these features became apparent in the New Order,

particularly since the 1980s. These are cultural presentations through which the making of the so-called *santri* middle class can be identified. Since the Muslim middle class is culturally growing, the presentations then go through what Bourdieu calls "cultural reproduction"; that is, "the perpetuation of existing cultural forms, values and ideas." Bourdieu argues that this perpetuation "means the reproduction and perpetuation of the culture of the dominant classes to ensure their continued dominance" (Jary and Jary 1995: 138).

Muslim Middle Class: Politico-cultural Setting

Since the Indonesian independence, the *santri* in the political context have been a marginalised group. They have never been a significant power. The Muslim community's attitude is typical of those of a minority group (Wertheim 1975; Schwarz 1997). In general, this is because politically and economically they have been on the periphery. They have been onlookers of the power circle, or borrowing Wertheim's words, "the representatives of the Moslem community have rather consistently been assigned an outsider's role" (1975: 75). Therefore, far from establishing an Islamic state, or at least holding a political hegemony, over the past decades they were a marginalised group and their political terrain was peripheral. Regarded as previously being under the political coercion of various Javanese kingdoms, then the European colonial regime and, after the 1945 independence, Soekarno's and Soeharto's authoritarian regimes,[2] the Muslim community has long been the 'outsiders.'

Discord between Islam and "the state" has been a characteristic of Indonesian history, is evidenced by rivalries among social and political leaders. Historically speaking, in the hands of the *kyai* (local Muslim leader), Islam has been, as called by Kahin (1952), "the ideological weapon", or the symbolic unifier of Indonesian society in resisting existing rulers. Since the thirteenth century, Islam has been the *pembangkang birokrasi* (bureaucratic opponent) that challenged the mystical aspects and absolute power of the Javanese kings (Samson 1968; K[illegible]ntowijoyo 1990). The Javanese rulers themselves saw Muslims as a civil force that threatened their own power and interests. In contest for authority, secular power was represented by the *priyayi* (of the kingship bureaucracy), and religious power was represented by the *kyai*. The two powers competed against each other in establishing social leadership within Javanese society (Moertono 1985; Anderson 1972).

During the New Order, as one who personified a Javanese king and internalized the Javanese values and history inherited from his predecessors, Soeharto saw that Islam remained more or less the same. He was "essentially hostile to Islam" (Hefner 1997a: 78). Prior to the 1980s, many Indonesianists believed that the Soeharto government was "a resolute defender of *abangan* Javanese values, deeply opposed to anything that might expand Muslim influence in Indonesian politics and society" (Hefner 1997a: 78).

The authority's hostility to Islam can be traced from the early days of Indonesian independence when the government refused the Djakarta Charter of 22 June 1945 that contained the clause *"Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya,"* or "Divinity with obligation to apply Islamic law among the Muslim portion of the populace" (Samson 1972; Feillard 1997). In this refusal, "President Soekarno's concept of *Pantjasila*, though recognizing religion as an important pillar of society, yet denied Islam a prominent position within the state structure, as the Moslem members of the preparatory committee had urged" (Wertheim 1975: 80). *Pantjasila* has been the ideological basis of the Indonesian state ever since. In another case, after its frequent political clashes with Soekarno and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and also after accusations of having been involved in the PRRI/Permesta revolt,[3] on 13 September 1960 Soekarno dissolved the most important Islamic party, Masjumi,[4] and also PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) which was considered its close ally. Not only did the Government ban Masjumi and eliminate Islamic political power, but in the 1960s it also began to restrict the political activities of Muslim politicians. Many activists were put in jail whether they had been involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellions or not.[5] These jailings had a big impact. Deliar Noer said that "on the one hand, people had become aware that the Soekarno government during Guided Democracy was tyrannical, and therefore had to be overthrown. On the other hand, people had become afraid; they had to think carefully before opposing the government" (Noer, 1987: 415). So great was Muslim hatred of Soekarno and his chief supporters, the PKI and the left-wing PNI at that time, that perhaps this was why Moslems were active in helping the New Order smash the Old Order.[6]

Entering the New Order period, Muslims banded together with university students who actively made stormy protests against Soekarno, were jubilant over the ruin of the Old Order, and wel-

comed the new political system with great expectancy. Contrary to their expectations, however, the Soeharto government continued to frustrate Muslim hopes with continued incidents of political suppression, such as refusing the reestablishment of Masjumi in 1968. After repeated calls for reestablishment, the Soeharto regime, backed by the military, stuck to its decision. This banning was followed up by the barring of Masjumi leaders from participation in the newly formed Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). Several years later, the government also aroused Muslim anger by legalizing secular marriage in 1975. The Muslims responded with stormy protests and demonstrations, even inside the Parliament House until eventually the law was modified to meet some of the objections put forward by the Islamic party, PPP (United Development Party). A decade later, under military Commander General Benny Moerdani, the regime executed a massacre of hundreds of Muslims in the 1984 Tanjung Priok 'closed-case.' Finally, in 1985, the government removed Islamic bases from all political parties and mass organizations by insisting that the state ideology of Pancasila become the sole organizing principle behind all societal groups (*Asas Tunggal*).

Soeharto's new regime turned out to be perhaps even more authoritarian than Soekarno's. Soeharto himself was very powerful and his government was the machine that underpinned his power. For more than thirty years, state politics dominated society. So great was the state's role and domination, that its power reached into every corner of public life. Soeharto established his power by means of three pillars ("*tiga jalur*"): the military, the bureaucracy, and the Golkar political party. Through the military he maintained the doctrine of *dwi fungsi ABRI* (the dual function of the military) whereby the armed forces held a valid role in politics as well as in defence and security. The militarization of the bureaucracy was an embodiment of the dual function doctrine. In the 1985 cabinet, out of a total of thirty seven ministers, fourteen had military backgrounds (Liddle 1996a: 19). Until 1985, in regional development, about three-quarters of the twenty seven governorships and a small majority of district were occupied by members of the armed forces.

Golkar, as the state's political body, enjoyed a ruling majority for nearly three decades and won election after election as a result of Soeharto's power. Consequently, the two other parties, PPP and PDI, were very weak, playing merely a supplementary role, and having no influence on the process of national decision making The very

existence of these parties was intended to create the illusion that Indonesia maintained a multiparty system, indicative of a democratic state. In addition, Soeharto mobilized the bureaucracy as an effective political machine to support the government. In Indonesia, the bureaucracy was powerful and dominated the government. According to Liddle (1996b:18), there were reasons for this: First, "The bureaucracy pervades society." Besides being the largest employer in every city, town, and village, almost every aspect of social affairs --such as health, banking, marketing agencies, and even religious affairs-- are linked to government control via the bureaucracy. Second, "Bureaucrats are the most powerful actors in most policy conflicts." Together, the military, Golkar and the bureaucracy comprised the main supports for Soeharto's government. This political structure of the New Order is described by Liddle as "a steeply ascending pyramid": "The heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency, and the president commands the military which is *primus inter pares* within the bureaucracy, which in turn holds sway over the society" (Liddle 1996b: 18).

With such strong state politics, the relation between the state and society was hegemonic. Nothing challenged the state. In the West, the press is called "the fourth estate" which helps balance the legislative, executive and judiciary branch of government. In Indonesia all of these roles were occupied by the state. In 1994, three national news magazines *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik* were banned. The New Order also successfully stifled the freedom of people's expression. Any social, political, cultural or religious activity aimed at criticizing the government was banned.

In 1965, within the Department of Defense and Security the Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) was formed. This was a very powerful institution that "enables the authorities to arrest and hold indefinitely anyone whom they suspect of subversive activity" (Liddle 1996b: 19). In instances where members of the Muslims were suspected as being a threat to Pancasila, the *santri* suffered from the actions of the Kopkamtib. Any religious speech, meeting, even discussion or seminar at that time needed the government's permission. The Kopkamtib was headed by Lt. Gen. Benny Moedarni. After that, prohibition after prohibition was declared by the Indonesian government. Arts performances, book publishing, student discussions, and anything that criticized the authorities was banned. Notwithstanding that the New Order

state had modern political institutions such as its congress (DPR), its People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and its judicial council, Soeharto, for more than three decades, was personally the only real power in Indonesian politics (Neher 1994; Fealy 1996; Liddle 1996b).

Faced with this unchanging policy and seeing that some non-Muslim political actors were holding important positions within the New Order elite circle, many in Muslim circles came to the conclusion that "the New Order government has been hijacked by an anti-Muslim alliance of Chinese Catholics, former PSI socialists, and armed officers. Most fingers pointed to Major General Ali Murtopo as the mastermind behind these policies" (Hefner 1997a: 78).[7] Surveying Soeharto's authoritarian government, Wertheim (1975: 88) concludes:

> No doubt, the umat Islam in Indonesia feels seriously frustrated. Not only has Islam not been able to increase its political position since Soekarno's fall; in fact Islam has been relegated to a position rather similar to the one it occupied during the colonial period. In this sense, too, the Soeharto regime could be called "neocolonialist". As during colonial times, the regime wants Islamic organizations to refrain from any political activity and to stick to innocuous, purely religious pursuits.

All these political constraints have repressed Muslims and given them the impression that they are in fact weak in power. This finally created the psychological condition where they felt that they were only a majority in numbers but a minority in quality. In turn, the Muslim majority turned out to be a minority in mentality, and this is clearly, as implied by Schwarz (1997: 129), "an anomaly." Schwarz concludes that the anomaly of a majority group that feels it is treated like a minority is often found in the relationship between and within Indonesia's religious communities. Schwarz feels that, "Muslim leaders often sound and act like members of a persecuted minority" (1997: 129-30).[8] When Muslims were enduring the most extreme political suppression at the beginning of the New Order, Mohammad Natsir, a Masjumi leader, expressed his anger by accurately and sorrowfully describing this condition: "They have treated us like cats with ring worm". (McVey 1983: 199)

Not only in a political sense have Muslims been treated "like cats with ring worm," there were also social reasons for Muslims to believe that they were a majority in numbers but a "minority" in human resources. This was felt strongly in the first years of the New Order period when the government undertook a policy of modern-

ization. It was apparent that the political arena was dominated by activists who came from secular nationalist, Christian, and socialist backgrounds. In addition, the prominent figures of Masjumi were being treated badly and their political attitudes were restricted. Furthermore, the majority of people --many of whom were Muslims-- were uneducated, poor and lacking skills.[9] Since the early period of the New Order, up to the 1970s, the Muslim community was unable to offer the quality of human resources required by the new independent state. This was because they were still in the phase of, in Ali's (1989) words, a *"sawah"* society, a term that associates them with an unskilled traditional agricultural society. Thus, political Islam was in decline and the New Order government was dominated by *abangan* figures, to the exclusion of Islamic-oriented figures. For several decades, Muslim figures who represented the political aspirations of the majority remained marginalised.

The Shaping of Muslim Middle Class

Since the 1980s, however, the landscape of Indonesian Muslim society has changed considerably. Dramatic shift in economic, political and religious life have occurred in part as a result of the massive development initiative pursued by the New Order government. In the political sphere, the New Order applied *Asas Tunggal* in 1985, in an attempt to dismiss 'primordial ideology' from political parties and mass organizations. The policy resulted in a process of "de-ideologization" and "de-politicization" within society. Many Muslim leaders left the formal political arena (political parties) and moved into broader cultural activities, such as education and religious proselytizing, although few became involved in the field of business. The cultural orientation program showed Muslims in a benign light, and resulted in a new government attitude towards the Muslim community. No longer were Islam-oriented groups considered 'radical' and 'ideological'.

In the economic sector, the success of the New Order economy (with am average GDP growth rate of more than 7.5 per cent per annum) increased people's income per capita from below US $420 to US $4500. A "revolution of education" also took place, thanks to annual increases in the government education budget. In addition, industrialization resulted in huge urbanization, underpinning the coming of new wealth. All of these factors contributed to the shaping of a new middle class of Muslims[10] that was characterized by being well-educated, professional, modernist, and active in the cul-

tural sphere. Having discarded the old political orientation, they consequently proved able to maintain better relations with the government.

Although still at a symbolic level, this new Muslim middle class became the drawing force for the process of Islamization which has occurred at almost all social and political levels in contemporary Indonesia. At the same time that Islamization was taking place, the middle class in general was becoming an increasingly significant force. Subsequently, as Muslims became increasingly upwardly mobile, the government opened itself to accommodate them. The Muslim middle class then, in this period, begun to enter the center of power. Government officials and bureaucrats experienced what was then called *"santrinisation"* (from *santri*, pious Muslim) and there was a "greening" process (green being the color of Islam) in the House of Representatives. While the *santri* tended to become more numerous, the *abangan* became more and more Islamic and less numerous. This was the period when the political capital of the *abangan* declined and that of the *santri* increased. The death knell of *abangan* domination was sounded when Soeharto himself, who was claimed as *abangan* and far from Islamic concerns, on 6 December 1990, supported and authorized the formation of Indonesia's newest and most controversial Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI).[11] A great sociopolitical change was occurring. According to Budiman, ICMI "has grown rapidly and has become very influential."

> Many of its members became members of parliament and some became cabinet ministers. A daily newspaper, *Republika*, was founded, an Islamic bank, *Bank Muamalat*, was established, and CIDES, a Muslim body for intellectuals and academicians, started to operate. Very quickly, this middle class Muslim organization has taken over the dynamic of the Islamic movement in Indonesia (Budiman, 1994: 232).

Not only was ICMI very influential, the organization also developed and expanded very quickly. At only its second national congress held in Jakarta,

> twelve hundred delegates, representing 42,000 members from all Indonesian provinces and from many Indonesian Islamic communities abroad, participated. Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, generally considered President Suharto's favorite cabinet member, was chosen for a second five-year term as national chair. Sixteen ministers, nearly half the cabinet, were elected to leadership positions, and the president himself was designated ICMI's 'Protector' *(Pelindung)* (Liddle 1996a: 613).

For the urban Muslim middle class, ICMI became the symbol of the awakening of Muslim political capital. More importantly, however, ICMI became the symbol of a modern identity whereby Muslims are no longer seen as "backward" or "marginal." Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a Muslim intellectual, pointed out that, "Formerly Islam was associated with backwardness and poverty and modern Muslims tended to be a bit ashamed of their Islam identity... [but today] Islam is no longer seen as the religion of the losers" (Vatikiotis 1996: 153). In other words, by way of ICMI, Islam came to be represented as modern. In the 1990s, the strength of ICMI made it valid and legal for a member of the elite to demonstrate their religious identity; an unprecedented psychological phenomenon arose where government officials and bureaucrats "contest to show off" their Islamic identities. At the time of Javanese *abangan* supremacy, this would have been impossible. *Santrinisasi birokrasi* (the "santrinisation" of the bureaucracy) and *birokratisasi santri* (the bureaucratization of the *santri*) became popular terms to describe the new Islam-State relationship. So remarkable was the shifting of hegemonic symbols at this time, that there was a social trend among the Indonesian elite, scholars and urban Muslim middle class to feel "out of date" if they did not become ICMI members. Liddle (1996a: 613) expressed great surprise that men from various non-Islamic backgrounds who were opposed to Islamic movements, like Vice-President General (ret.) Try Sutrisno, the 1988-1993 armed forces commander, former Vice-President Lieutenant General (ret.) Sudharmono, who during the 1945-49 independence revolution was regarded as having links to the leftist wing, and many others such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (former leader of PSI), PNI (Indonesian National Party) official Ginanjar Kartasasmita, and General (ret.) Rudini, a former Army Chief of Staff and Minister of Home Affairs took part in the establishment of ICMI. Liddle (1996a: 614) also stated that "many prominent Islamic intellectuals and activists outside the state were also listed among the organization's 148 officers." These included K.H Ali Yafie, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Imaduddin Abdulrahim and several other leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama (an Islamic organization with approximately 30 million members), and Amien Rais, the head of Muhammadiyah at that time (the second largest Islamic social and educational organization), who "played a key role at the congress and was elected chair of ICMI's Council of Experts".

The growth of Muslim political capital has been widely cited as evidence of the emergence of the Muslim middle class (Kuntowijoyo 1991; Hefner 1993; Nakamura 1993; Budiman 1994; Ramage 1995;

Anwar 1995).[12] Yet how was the Muslim middle class shaped? Vatikiotis argues that there "has been [a] social dislocation which plagues any fast-growing urban society. Many people have strengthened their faith as a reaction to the flagrant disregard for traditional moral values they see around them" (1996: 153). Other scholars reach the same conclusion. The recent Islamization process that facilitated the establishment of ICMI is a manifestation of the rising and widening of the Muslim middle class that occurred over the last two decades and could not be ignored by the government.

Apart from the mobilization of the *santri,* there has also been an interplay of factors between the government and the Islamic *umat.* Nurcholish Madjid (1998) describes this interplay as "a meeting of objective and subjective conditions." The objective condition is government acceptance of Islam and the subjective condition is Muslim hope to dominate the government. These two conditions, according to Nurcholish, were seen in the *"penghijauan"* ("greenization") process of the People's Consultative Council (MPR) and overwhelming Islamization in the 1990s:

> It is very natural as a result of the meeting of objective conditions and subjective desires. There is clearly the Soeharto factor apart from the people's aspiration itself. That is the result of a lengthy process as an effect of the agreement of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Education in 1950. It was agreed at that time that religious schools would have general education and conversely, general schools would have religious education. Accordingly, many *santri* parents sent their children to general schools because they no longer had a psychological burden. As a result, in the 1960s, the number of Bachelor of Art (BA) degree holders was overwhelming, and in the 1970s, the numbers of *Sarjana* overflowed. However, they were still motivated by individual affairs in this period. Some tried to look for a job and others got married. In the 1980s, they began to expand themselves beyond their communities so there were Islamic appearances seen everywhere in offices, hotels, and the like. However, this was still a social phenomenon. Only in the 1990s, the political nuance was felt. And this is an understandable development. If this is stemmed it will be dangerous because such an act will be against the stream. Soeharto who has been deeply involved in the process of development was quite wise to grasp it so he could support the establishment of ICMI, besides he feels it would be safe to be in the Islamic community. For that reason, the so-called *"penghijauan"* is something natural and it will persistently develop until the new equilibrium is shaped. The situation today still lacks balance.[13]

In supporting this conclusion, Mahasin (1984) argues that the rise of Muslim middle class is evidence of two phenomena: *First*, what Mahasin (1984) called "the *embourgeoisement* of Muslim sons and daughters, or the *priyayisasi* of *santri*". Mahasin disagrees with Geertz's bazaar economy approach,[14] and argues that the sending of Muslim sons

and daughters to modern schools is responsible for the rise of this new generation because, by way of this education route, the Muslim sons and daughters are propelled into new middle class membership. Through this explanation, Mahasin confirms Bourdieu's ideas concerning "cultural capital." Bourdieu argues that in order to reach or to maintain a certain class position within a society, modern society no longer transmits material property to its children, but uses 'cultural capital' --the provision of a home environment of study, general inculcation of the values of the educational system or sending children to school to gain a better position in society. By doing so, children will have social privileges and can enter the elite circle despite the absence of private property (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Second, the quest for religious expression by the urban middle class, who due to rapid secularization can not find peace in modern civilization and eventually seek a return to their faith. As Vatikotis observed:

> Submission to faith in Islamic societies can offer relief from the symptoms of social and economic malaise [...] because it allows escape into a well-defined moral realm, and an abandonment of worldly concerns. This need for a moral refuge could help explain why, despite the assumption that religion has been eroded as a force in mainstream politics in the post-independence era, the role of religion as a social force may be growing (Vatikiotis, 1996: 154).

With the rise of this class, the Muslim position in the 1990s has changed drastically. "From the lower class based movement, it has been transformed into [a] middle class one. From a movement based outside the State, the Muslim struggle has become a struggle from within the State" (Budiman, 1994: 233). In other words, the previously marginalised Muslims have today capitalised on their power by moving into the power center and created a new equilibrium within Indonesia's plural society. "After nearly three decades the New Order has come into power," Ma'arif (1994) writes, "just in this the sixth cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan VI) of 1993, the quantity of ministers properly reflects the balance of the Indonesian population where Muslims are a majority. Around 90% of all ministers are *santri* both in qualitative and quantitative meanings." This has been the period of, as Liddle (1996a: 913) puts it, "the Islamic turn in Indonesia."[15]

Cultural Presentations

According to Rao (1999: 56), class as well as a collective identity in a given society are formed by a variety of social codes depending

on the kind of allegiance, ascription and affiliation they draws on. Code such as language, religion, ideology, or even more trivial things such as dress, fashion, taste, etc. held to define ones class. These codes bind class members with a collective identity, or in other words, the collective identity is formed by many class codes. It is in this sense that the broader outlet of the Muslim middle class expression exceeding politics and economy can be identified. Contemporary phenomena within the Indonesian Muslim community during the period of the 1980s and 1990s such as the wearing of the veil; Bimbo's modern religious songs and Kiayi Kanjeng music; the emergence of ICMI; modern Islamic media such as the journal of *Ulumul Qur'an, Ummat* magazine, and the daily *Republika*; and finally the elite's prestigious *pengajian* (Islamic learning) can be best understood as cultural codes of expression that constitute Muslim middle class identity. These five cultural traits will be discussed in depth below.

Head Cover: Affirmation of Identity

Beginning at the Salman mosque in Bandung, West Java, the popularity of Islamic dress spread initially to other universities throughout Indonesia, and later to senior high school students[16] before finally being accepted by the middle class. Urbanized Muslims were faced with the dilemma of how to be modern at the price of dislocation and alienation, and how to maintain their cultural roots at the expense of the loss of modernity. In other words, for the urbanized Muslims, it was painful to be fully modern and also painful to leave their traditions. "Islamist symbols, commitment, and beliefs," Huntington argues, then "meet these psychological needs." (1996: 116) Crowded into decaying and often primitive slum areas, the urban migrants were separated from their roots. In this context, Ernest Gellner implies, Islam provides "a dignified identity" to these "newly uprooted masses" (Huntington 1996: 113) Muslims felt the need to return to Islamic ideas, practices, and institutions to provide direction and build momentum toward modernization.

The Islamic symbols and commitment that provided a new identity were effective because they functioned as what Bourdieu called '*habitus*.' *Habitus* consists of "systems of durable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as the principle of generation and structuration of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and regular ..." (Bourdieu 1977: 73). The dispositions are acquired through a gradual process of inculca-

tion or are inculcated in a durable way: "the body is literally moulded into certain forms, so that the *habitus* is reflected in the whole way that one carries oneself in the world, the way that one walks, speaks, acts, eats" (Thompson, 1995: 102). As durable generative principles, *habitus* produces and reproduces the 'practices' of a class. The socialization and transmission of the veil through student networks have acted to create this '*habitus*', for it was practised persistently, adjusted durably, and finally after a very long period, came to represent a new class --the Muslim middle class. The individuals who wear the veil "do not know what they are doing, that what they do has more meaning than they know" (Bourdieu, 1977: 79). By spreading the veil-wearing practice to others within the student world, head-scarved women "continually construct their social worlds through their everyday practices and endow their existences with meaning" (Keaton 1999: 49). Wearing the veil is more than just obeying religious rules and conforming to identity, it contributes to the formation of a new class.

In the gradual process of inculcation, the popularization of veil wearing gained its reinforcement from the Iranian revolution that erupted in 1979. With Indonesian Muslims aware that Islam had been eliminated culturally and politically in many countries, the revolution provided a new self-esteem, new identity and pride. In the years after the Iranian revolution, the author often witnessed head-scarved students proudly bearing the Koran in their hands in public places such as city buses, department stores and the streets of Bandung, West Java. In terms of Islamic dress, many of them imitated the style of the Iranians: women in totally black uniforms and men in Iranian clergy head covers.

The development of religious consciousness is a phenomenon of urbanized Muslim students as well as the urbanized middle class. Mariana Ramelan, a popular Indonesian television figure, feels more secure and safe with her head-scarf that she began to wear after returning from the *hajj* in 1989. For many years, after obtaining success in her career as a music show presenter, Ramelan found her life meaningless. She says "this is a religious obligation. The veil I put on makes me feel more secure and safe" (*Ummat*, 5 February 1996). Since deciding to wear the veil in 1978, Ida Royani, a top Indonesian actress of the 1970s, felt proud when she was able to refuse film and commercial offers that came to her, associating film with the secular world, glamour and the like (*Ummat*, 30 October 1995). Ida Leman, a prominent television star, feeling that it was impossible to take off her head-scarf, proudly rejected an offer to market a product simply because

she was asked to wear the *kebaya* (Javanese traditional dress) on her show. "While it's an honour... wow ... it's great, however, I should reject it." After praying and asking for God's blessing to maintain the veil wearing, Leman said: "You see, since then, I've got a greater business of joining the Islamic dress exhibition conducted in several countries" (*Ummat*, 30 October 1995). Apart from providing a feeling of safety and security, the Islamic dress also offers identity confirmation and freedom of self-expression. By covering their head with the veil, Muslim women confirm their religious commitment and identity. Expressing their commitment leads to a freedom from psychological burdens that arise from believing in religion on one hand and ignoring or breaking its doctrines on the other.

The widespread return to religious symbols of confirmation of identity can also be seen from the mushrooming business of selling Islamic dress *(busana Muslimah)* to middle class people. As the crisis of identity tends to most notably affect urbanized people suffering from disorientation and dislocation, religious symbols like the veil have offered an effective alternative. Since the 1980s, veil wearing has become widespread. Under the trademark of "*Khoirunisa,*" the head-scarved Sitoresmi Prabuningrat, a former wife of the well-known Indonesian poet --W.S. Rendra--has expanded her Islamic dress business to Medan, Batam and Kalimantan. She said, "its market is full of potential, particularly among students" (*Ummat*, 25 December 1996). Also meeting this demand is Fenny Mustafa, an Islamic dress businesswoman from Bandung, West Java, who has established two labels: *Shafira*, a product and trademark aimed at the upper middle class, and *Syahida*, targeting university students. *Syafira* is well known in Bandung. The middle class have been its main customers contributing to its total assets of more than Rp. 2.5 billion. An exclusive Islamic dress boutique also exists in Surabaya, East Java. This boutique is organized and owned by Nadhifah Jufri, a deputy head of IWAPI. Apart from being a regular supplier for department stores, Jufri also exports products to Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, the Middle East and Japan (*Ummat*, 30 September 1996). The *Karima*, a business run by the "three Srikandi" (*Srikandi* being the symbol of Indonesian heroic women), Ida Royani, Anne Rufaidah and Ida Leman, produces luxury products with high prices that are specifically targeting at middle class consumers.

Since a religion consists of beliefs, values and a relationship with God, religious action is driven by a sacred sense of satisfaction (Durkheim 1954; Nelson 1987). In the case of the Islamic dress business in contem-

porary Indonesia, apart from its economic ends, it has also been powered by religious motivations: First, those who were involved in the veil business were middle class women who themselves wore head scarves, and second, the veil business was a totally new phenomenon traced to the Islamic resurgence that occurred from the 1980s. Veil wearing is most prominent amongst the Muslim middle class and its numbers are increasing. The phenomenon can thus be considered as one of the cultural expressions that confirm its formation.

Bimbo's Kasidah *Music*

Along with the popularity of the head-covering, a type of music, first introduced by a *santri* group called Bimbo has emerged. This music consist of modern *kasidah* (Islamic religious songs) and it has performed by Bimbo since the 1980s. Through the popular medium of the music, Bimbo introduced *kasidah* as another Islamic symbol and reinforced the religious identity of the middle class, which previously crystallized around the veil. Acil, one of the four Bimbo members, states that the modern *kasidah* songs are intended to cater to the music taste of urban people (Sumarsono, 1998: 179). The religious revival amongst the urban middle class in the 1980s seems to "find their religious-aesthetic mode in Bimbo's religious music which is serene, quite and peaceful." (*Ummat*, 19 February 1996; Sumarsono 1998) As an alternative to the old style which tended to be dominated by traditional Arabic instruments, tunes and lyrics, Bimbo plays modern musical instruments which, a music observer Franky Raden believes, beautifully transforms religious values by way of pop music (*Ummat,* 19 Februari 1996).

Their first religious song was written in 1973 entitled *"Tuhan"* (God). The inspiration came to Sam in contemplation while he was listening to a delivery of the Jum'at Prayer at the Salman mosque located in the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). Containing simple words and sung tenderly, it sounds like a universal elegy:[17]

Tuhan . . .
tempat aku berteduh
dimana aku mengeluh
dengan segala peluh
Tuhan . . .
Tuhan Yang Maha Esa
tempat aku memuja
dengan segala do'a
Aku jauh Engkau jauh

Aku dekat Engkau dekat
hati adalah cermin
tempat pahala dan dosa bertarung

(Oh God . . .
in you I take shelter
when I complain
with all my sighs
Oh God . . .
the One and only God
You I worship
with all my prayers
When I am distant You are distant
when I come near You come near
the heart is a mirror
a place where reward and sin are contested)

Inspired by the warm response *"Tuhan"* received, Bimbo decided to release special religious songs in collaboration with Taufiq Ismail, a prominent poet and literary writer who played a key role in the success of Bimbo's *kasidah*. This collaboration between musicians and literary writer resulted in more than a hundred songs, with 90 of them written by Taufik Ismail. 25 of those 90 are special songs focusing on the 25 messengers of God from Adam to Jesus Christ and concluding with the Prophet Muhammad. Some of the most popular songs are *"Umat Manusia Kini Bergembira"* (Human Kind Are Now Happy), *"Rindu Rasul"* (Missing the Messenger), *"Kasidah Matahari dan Rembulan"* (The Sun and Moon Kasidah), *"Kasidah Anak Bertanya Pada Bapaknya"* (The Child Questions His Father Kasidah), *"Dikaulah Tuhan Terindah"* (You are the Most Beautiful God), *"Ada Sajadah Panjang"* (There is a Long Prayer Rug), *"Setiap Habis Ramadhan"* (Every End of Ramadhan), *"Rasul Menyuruh Kita Mencintai Anak Yatim"* (The Prophet Ordered Us to Love the Orphans), *"Fajar 1 Syawal"* (The First Dawn of Syawal), and *"Jabal Rahmah"* (The Hill of Rahmah).

One of the enchanting things about these songs is "the depth of religiosity" (*Kompas*, 14 December 1997), which is attained by the use of a slow pop rhythm. This was another factor which made Bimbo's *kasidah* special --they "transformed religious values into pop songs" (*Ummat*, 19 February 1996). Through this pop medium where words rather than music dominate, the new *kasidah* was able to connect with the listeners' deepest feelings. The quality of lyrics certainly plays a crucial role. Amid the hustle and bustle of modern life, moral degradation, social uncertainty and everyday crime, urban society craves moral

figures who can transform such social problems. In the absence of this moral leadership, Muslims have bestowed their greatest love on the figure of the Prophet Muhammad. Bimbo reflects this phenomenon in "*Rindu Rasul*" (Missing the Messenger). Lin Parlina admitted that performing this song often drained her and the audience.

Rindu kamu padamu ya Rasul
rindu tiada terkira
berabad jarak darimu ya Rasul
terasa dikau disini

Cinta ikhlasmu pada manusia
bagai cahaya suarga
dapatkah kami membalas cintamu
secara bersahaja . . .

(We miss you ... oh ... the Messenger
a longing that is unmeasurable
centuries of distance from you
as if you are here

Your great love for human kind
is like the light of heaven
can we return your love
with true intention . . .)

As a result of their deep connection with their message, Bimbo's singers are often unable to continue performing their songs and turn their backs on the audience and stop singing (*Kompas*, 14 December 1997). *Kompas* refers to the case in Kemajoran, Jakarta in 1993. Bimbo was solemnly singing the song *The Messenger Ordered Us to Love the Orphans* in front of 5,000 orphans and elderly.

Rasul menyuruh kita mencintai anak yatim
Rasul menyuruh kita mengasihi orang miskin
Dunia penuh dengan orang yang malang
Mari dengan rata kita bagi cahaya matahari
Mari dengan rata kita bagi cahaya bulan
The Messenger ordered us, the Messenger ordered us . . .

(The messenger ordered us to love the orphans
The messenger ordered us to love the poor
the world is full of unfortunate people
Let us share the sunlight
Let us share the moonlight
The messenger ordered us . . .
The messenger ordered us . . .)

Bimbo's *kasidah* received a huge response. It is as if they provided a peaceful space and offered the beauty of religiosity and the serenity of religious devotion to those urban people buffeted by rapid social change. During every Ramadhan and *Ied Fitr* celebration, these new *kasidah* are broadcast on Indonesian television. Many prominent singers take part in these performance. According to Acil, *kasidah* are sung by members of the *Darmawanita* (An Association for the Wives of Civil Servants), student musical groups, and government ministers, as well as being performed in religious music festivals.[18]

However, the question is, having gained popularity, why did Bimbo suddenly turn its focus to religious themes? What does this indicate? And what kind of sociocultural circumstances caused the four siblings to focus their concerns into *kasidah* which, at that time was a marginalised and unpromising type of music? It is interesting to examine this shift in orientation. The first explanation is that Bimbo's religious concerns were based on a growing religious consciousness coupled with the process of Islamization occurring amongst middle class people. Through *kasidah*, Sam hoped to make a kind of submission to God. "There was self-satisfaction when we created the religious songs. It was a religious call. We produced it intensively and hopefully this was our submission . . . By producing the *kasidah* songs we've obtained valuable things that can not be measured in material terms" he stated. (Sumarsono 1998: 173-174) Bimbo felt that producing and singing religious songs which entail prayers of adoration to God, the Prophet Muhammad and religion, was the highest form of art and the greatest accomplishment for a composer. "In this way," Sam points out, "Bimbo finds happiness, pride and amenity as Muslims" (Sumarsono 1998: 182).

How were Bimbo's *kasidah* absorbed by the middle class? There were at least four conditions that I will examine which facilitated the widespread acceptance of Bimbo's *kasidah* into the new middle class: the hegemony of modern western music, the dislocation and spiritual malaise created by rapid social change, the special character of the new *kasidah*, and the confirmation of a new identity embraced by 'the Muslim middle class.'

The clatter of modern secular music[19] included rock'n roll, hard rock, country or pop represented by the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Scorpion, Deep Purple, Metallica, Sepultura, Michael Jackson, Madonna and so on (to mention a few of the most popular in Indonesia) have dominated and been integrated into the musical culture of the modernized urban people of Indonesia. As a result, musical groups

that existed in the 1960s and 1970s in Indonesia such as Koes Plus, The Lloyd, Panbers, Lex's Trio, Patty Sisters, Abadi Soesman, The Mercy's, The Crabs and so forth, and more recently in the 1980s, Elfa's singers, God Bless, Kla Project, Trio Libels, Slank, Dewa 19, Boomerang, Gigi, and hundreds of solo singers were only the "imitators" or "channels" of the empire of western modern music.[20] This kind of modern music has hegemonically developed almost without alternative and there is no indication that the influence of western music will decline in the future.

With this hegemony of secular modern music, the urbanized santri middle class imagines a space of private self-expression that reminds them of their religious messages, values and peace that they were exposed to in the village. Ramadhan K.H., a well-known literary writer, is one of those who feels strongly about this missing spiritual nuance and finds it in Bimbo:

> During my later years, every lead up to the fasting month and Ied Fitr, we met with Bimbo, feeling the same serenity that I enjoyed as a child in Cianjur, a town renowned for its religiosity. The musical depths that were reached through the Cianjuran songs and the intimacy obtained from the barjanzi [a religious tradition of reciting stories about the greatness of the Prophet Muhammad aimed at memorization and praise for his great moral attitude] sounded from many mosques and *mushalla*, and now in my old age that atmosphere is again transmitted by Bimbo (Sumarsono 1998: 5).

Once members of the *santri* identified themselves as middle class, their musical tastes, language, dress, and life-style also changed. A different class tends to have different musical tastes. As described by Simon Frith, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of taste clearly explains this relation between class and musical taste:

> People produce and consume the music they are capable of producing and consuming; different social groups possess different sorts of knowledge and skill, share different cultural histories, and so make music differently. Musical tastes do correlate with class cultures and subcultures; musical styles are linked to specific age groups; we can take for granted the connections of ethnicity and sound (Frith 1996: 120).

Therefore, traditional *kasidah* songs as offered by music groups like *orkes gambus* or *rebana* in which the lyrics are Arabic do not match the aesthetic taste of the educated middle class. Music like *orkes gambus* and *rebana*, for several decades, has remained marginalised and is viewed as a musical expression of the traditional Islamic experience which includes *pesantren* and *madrasah*. In the absence of a

middle class religious aesthetic expression, the popularity of Bimbo's *kasidah* in the 1980s and 1990s can be understood.

If mosques have provided the only refuge for the dislocated Muslim middle class, Bimbo's serene *kasidah* music provides something else: "a sort of religious music which is lonely and peaceful, a purity which is solemn and composed. And for the people, it is as if they find themselves in a space of peaceful consciousness" (*Ummat,* 19 February 1996). The middle class, according to Afrizal Malna, a literary writer, is a class of people with a split social base. Therefore, they need a sense of individual space, a place to find themselves as individuals and that very space is what Bimbo provided. A musician, Harry Roesly, says that Bimbo's *kasidah* is contemplative music, especially for those middle class individuals who seek a value system (*Ummat,* 19 February 1996). In other words, Bimbo's *kasidah* accommodates the psychological needs of both the *santri* for symbols of urban identity, and the urban middle class for symbols of religious identity.

The success of Bimbo is inseparable from the special musical character it has created. This character is apparently the key to why the group is widely welcomed and can be absorbed by a middle class audience. First, there are the Indonesian lyrics. Unlike the traditional *kasidah* that used Arabic lyrics and was dominated by *rebana,* Bimbo has totally changed this image. All of Bimbo's lyrics are in Indonesian so their[a] songs can be truly absorbed because the listeners are able to understand the messages. More than that, not only have Indonesian lyrics made the messages easier to communicate, but the band's emphasis on words rather than music has been the power of the *kasidah* itself. Bimbo "has replicated" the successes of the 1960s western pop and country singers. As is widely known, many of the 1960s and 1970s songs have become classics. If people today still enjoy the songs of the Bee Gees, Abba, the Four Brothers, the Everly Brothers, the Carpenters and the like as well as songs from solo singers like Elvis Presley, Andy William, Nat King Cole, Matt Monroe, Louis Amstrong, Jim Reeves, Engelbert Humperdinck, John Denver, Tom Jones, Frank Sinatra, Connie Francis, Patty Page and so on, it is largely because those songs had dominant lyrics and clear-cut voices. Certain songs like The Rolling Stones' "Honkytonk Women," or The Beatles' "Please Please Me," Scorpion's "Always Somewhere" have also been well remembered for their beat, rhythm, and danceability, not just for their lyrics. However, for music that has a message, clear lyrics and voices are important. Messages will be more easily memorized and internalized if the articulation is clear and easy to understand.

Second, instead of the *rebana* dominating, Bimbo uses acoustic guitars, flutes and other innovative instruments that can recreate sounds of Arabic desert rhythms. In the song entitled *"Kasidah Matahari dan Rembulan"* (The Sun and Moon Kasidah), the guitar has nicely reproduced the typical sound of an Arabic desert melody. The *kasidah* is thus inseparable from Arabic desert music. Maintaining nuances of desert rhythm in the *kasidah* is important in order not to lose its historical context. For Muslims the desert has spiritual meaning, it is the place where Islam (as well as the other two eastern religions: Christianity and Judaism) originated and where the messengers of God were born.

Third, while the old *kasidah* is always performed with a special Arabic rhythm, Bimbo sings theirs in a style indicative of pop music. Pop music is always the musical mainstay among other genres in many societies. In the United States in the 1960s, popular music was the outlet of social movements and helped establish collective identities. "The movement was articulated," Eyerman and Jamison (1998: 108) remarked, "not merely through organizations and even mass demonstrations, although there were plenty of both, but perhaps even more significantly through popular music ... Movement ideas, images, and feelings were disseminated in and through popular music and, at the same time, the movements of the times influenced developments, in both form and content, in popular music." Bimbo has transformed religious values into pop music. This is what has helped Bimbo's style of *kasidah* gain its vast popularity. The fans of Bimbo, said Acil, "were initially among the middle class and then spread to all levels of society."[21]

Last, the lyrics are not always expressed in a normative religious fashion. This is very important indeed. Like religious sermons that are often delivered in normative religious language, the traditional *kasidah* does not impact a peaceful feeling to its listeners. On the other hand, almost none of Bimbo's *kasidah* songs were written in normative language. In this way, not only were the religious messages made pleasant to listen to, but they also appeared benign rather than radical. This is obviously very significant, especially when religious songs are intended to call people to return to their religion. Normative and strictly doctrinal languages, apart from causing people to fear religion, also possibly cause people to keep away from it. Performing *shalat* (the five daily prayers) for instance is obligatory for all adult Muslims, non performance, doctrinally speaking, is a sin. In addition, among believers, the

Prophet's saying is well-known that commitment to prayer is a watershed to distinguish whether one should be called a Muslim or not. However, in the song *"Jangan Tolak Kenikmatan"* (Don't Refuse Bliss) Bimbo did not sing it in doctrinal perspective:

Ada orang yang berkata
Ibadah itu nanti kalau tua saja
Ada kenalan yang bilang
kalau sudah tua saya kan sembahyang

Ternyata shalat itu nikmat
terasa teduh serta damai
dan tenang . . .

(There are some people who say
I'll worship when I get older
there is a friend who says
when I am old I'll perform the prayers

in fact performing prayers is enjoyable
it is calm and peaceful
and full of content. . .)

In the mid 1980s, the wearing of the veil that had become a social movement among Muslim schoolgirls and university students, turned out to be a hot topic of national political debate between government officials who were worried about growing fundamentalism and the number of veil wearing participants. From a Muslim perspective, the veil was an expression of religious belief. The participants believed it was obligatory for Muslim women and had nothing to do with politics. Bimbo supported the movement by releasing a song about the veil which, again, employed informal rather than overtly religious language. It was entitled *"Aisyah Adinda Kita"* (Aisyah Our Sister):

Aisyah Adinda kita yang sopan dan jelita
angka SMP dan SMA sembilan rata-rata
pandai mengarang dan organisasi
mulai Muharam satu empat nol satu
memakai jilbab menutup rambutnya
busana muslimah amat pantasnya

Aisyah adinda kita yang sopan dan jelita
indeks prestasi tertinggi tiga tahun lamanya
calon insinyur dan bintang di kampus
bulan Muharam satu empat nol empat
tetap berjilbab menutup rambutnya
busana Muslimah amat pantasnya

Aisyah adinda kita
tidak banyak berkata
Aisyah adinda kita
hanya memberi contoh saja

Ada sepuluh Aisyah berbusana muslimah
Ada seratus Aisyah berbusana muslimah
Ada sejuta Aisyah berbusana muslimah
Ada sejuta Aisyah, Aisyah adinda kita . . .

(Aisyah, our sister who is polite and beautiful
averaging nine in her SMP and SMA grades
competent in composition and organization
since Muharram [a name of Islamic month] one four zero one
wore the jilbab covering her hair
how appropriate the Muslim dress is

Aisyah, our sister who is polite and pretty
has been top of her class for three years
a future engineer and a star on campus
on Muharram month one four zero four
she still wears the head-scarved
how appropriate the Muslim dress is

Aisyah, our sister
doesn't say much
Aisyah, our sister
she just leads by example

there are ten Aisyahs wearing head-scarves
there are a hundred Aisyahs wearing head-scarves
there are a million Aisyahs wearing head-scarves
there are a million Aisyahs, Aisyah our sister)

Obviously, this song has reinforced schoolgirls' struggles for their beliefs and new identity. Linked to a social movement, music, according to Gilroy, is no longer just music, but it provides "a great deal of the courage":

> The power of music in developing our struggles by communicating information, organizing consciousness and testing out, deploying, or amplifying the forms of subjectivity which are required by political agency, individual and collective, defensive and transformational, demands attention to both the formal attributes of this tradition of expression and its distinctive *moral* basis . . . In the simplest terms, by posing the world as it is against the world as the racially subordinated went it to be, this musical culture supplies a great deal of the courage required to go on living in the present. (Frith 1996: 118)

A similar tendency is seen in the songs *"Wudhu"* (Ablution), *"Sajadah Panjang"* (A Long Prayer Rug) and *"Jangan di Tunda-tunda"*

(Don't Procrastinate) which encourage Muslims to perform the five daily prayers; while "Kasidah Anak Bertanya pada Bapaknya" (The Child Questions his Father Kasidah) and *"Setiap Habis Ramadhan"* (Every End of Ramadhan) encourages them to fast during Ramadhan; *"Jabal Rahmah"* (The Hill of Rahmah) encourages them to make a pilgrimage to the holy city, Mecca; and *"Rasul Menyuruh Kita Mencintai Anak Yatim"* (The Messenger Ordered Us to Love the Orphans) encourage people to give alms. In this context, Taufiq Ismail, according to Bimbo's fans, is admirable and deserves high praise for writing the *kasidah* lyrics. Through this scholar, Bimbo have released 90 songs with religious messages. Incidentally, an unpredictable outcome, as reported by Acil, was that many fans of Bimbo's *kasidah* are Christians.[22]

Before Bimbo turned its focus to *kasidah*, the Islamic *umat* was still predominantly a *sawah* society[23] and was not yet urbanized. In other words, the *umat Islam* was a social stratum based in rural areas. The religious musical expression of the rural people was associated with the sort of music that existed amidst the rural community of *santri*, notably *orkes gambus* and *rebana* always had pride of place on Islamic celebration days such as *Maulid Nabi* (Muhammad's birth day) and *Isra Mi'raj* a great historical event in Islamic history when the Prophet Muhammad was taken up by God to "the seventh sky" and brought to *Sidratul Muntaha*, a "place" in which Muhammad allegedly "saw God's face" and received the command of five daily prayers. This kind of marginalised Arabic music has for a long time expressed the identity of the *santri* almost without innovation.

Under the New Order, urbanization brought many *santri* into urban areas causing them to be separated from their traditional roots. In the new urban areas, they were separated from the sources of religious symbols that united them as *santri* in the village. As members of the new middle class, they needed new symbols of religiosity that would reinforce their identity as the new urban *santri*. When Bimbo's musicians expressed themselves through popular music with religious lyrics, without anger and passion, this newly urbanized middle class *santri* found symbols of religious expression in this pop *kasidah*. The religious spirit that was revived through *kasidah* text and rhythm provided a sense of identification and of belonging to a group, and the text reflected a range of diverse yet shared experiences of the Muslim middle class. Bimbo established a musical genre with a religio-cultural identity. This genre strengthened the identity coding of this

class beyond veil wearing. If the veil symbolized, especially amongst women, a middle class return to religion, the *kasidah* provided an artistic aesthetic for this class.

The Formation ICMI: A Modern Symbol of Muslim Identity

Many Muslims believe that Islam can not be separated from politics (see Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). For them, politics is viewed as the most effective vehicle with which to manifest the ideal of Islam: the establishment of an Islamic society which is ruled under the guidance of Islamic norms for the sake of salvation in the world and the hereafter. Muslims believe that Islam is a way of life that encompassed affairs pertaining to religion and politics, individuals and society, economy and culture, family and state, peace and war. Given these orientation, Ernest Gellner (1969:127) concludes that, "Islam is, more perhaps than other religions, a blueprint of a social order." According to Gellner, this can be seen from the characteristics exhibited by this religion:

> One might say that Islam is more total, in a number of dimensions: it does not restrict its appeal territorially; it does not restrict its application to some institutions only; and it does yet have a kind of independent existence in scriptural and normative record, and cannot simply be equated with the practices of a society in which it occurs. The first of these characteristics differentiates it from Judaism and much of Christianity. The third differentiates it from tribal religions, which might otherwise, in some cases, be held to be total in the second sense. (Gellner 1969: 127)

The establishment of ICMI (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) on December 6-8 1990, can be regarded as one of the "highest achievements" of Indonesian Muslim politics. Unlike the formation of other Muslim organizations, ICMI's inaugural meeting was led by a President (Soeharto) and closed by a Vice-President (Soedharmono), attended by 500 Muslim intellectuals, scholars and many high-ranking government officials, and headed by the Minister of Research and Technology, B.J Habibie.

Throughout the history of Indonesia, nearly all Islamic movements from the colonial period up to the New Order had a political goal. In the pre-colonial period, Islam, under the leadership of *ulama*, was a symbol of the people's challenge towards the absolutist power of the Hindu Javanese kingdoms (Moertono 1985; Anderson 1972). During colonial times, Islam became a symbol of rebellion against the Portu-

guese, Dutch, English, and Japanese colonizers. Local Muslim leaders such as Prince Diponegoro in Central Java, Imam Bonjol in West Sumatra, and Pattimura in the Moluccas "weakened the Dutch and tied up the colonial military forces. In the late 1800s, the Dutch waged a bloody, thirty-year war with the fiercely Muslim sultanate of Aceh on the Western tip of Sumatra" (Schwarz 1994: 4). Several years after independence, the Masjumi political party constitutionally struggled for an Islamic state. The *Darul Islam* (DI) also struggled for an Islamic state by means of rebellion in the 1950s. Finally, under the New Order, the strategy of "political Islam," that marginalised Muslims and made them "a majority with a minority mentality" changed to "cultural Islam," another face of political Islam, that led to rapprochement with the state. In short, most Islamic movements have an orientation toward political power. ICMI then can be viewed in a sense is as a form of Muslim co-optation of the state, rather than merely the New Order government's attempt to co-opt Islam, as others have suggested.

The formation of ICMI is seen here as a result of the Islamization process that has taken place since the 1970s. ICMI emerged, as Azra noted, as "the concrete embodiment of what has so far been called an 'organic Islamization' that overwhelmed all levels of Muslim communities" (*Panji Masyarakat*, 21 December 1990). From campuses this Islamization then spread wider, beyond the university; to political parties (Golkar and PDI), government and private offices, groups of artists, professionals, businessmen, and the state bureaucracy. Islam experienced a vertical mobilization process. According to Dawam Rahardjo, this massive Islamization produced an unavoidable political impact because Islam in Indonesia is an important source of political legitimacy (Rahardjo, 1995: 345). The upward mobility of the *santri* facilitated Islamization in the state bureaucracy. Since the mid-1980s, many government officials —albeit in a symbolic way— are no longer reluctant to show their Islamic identities. President Soeharto himself performed the pilgrimage and addressed many Muslim aspirations. All these developments finally culminated in the establishment of ICMI. The highest ranking government officials, from cabinet ministers to President Soeharto, took part and supported the establishment of this new Muslim organization.[25]

The emergence of ICMI stimulated a broad controversy due to the strong political implications of its establishment. This study suggests, however, that for Muslims, the formation of ICMI was much

more than a political action, it represented the modern cultural identity of the Muslim middle class. Most analyses of ICMI have concentrated on the perspective of political conflict and interests, and fail to understand the spirit or motivation behind ICMI's establishment and the meaning of ICMI for the Muslim community. Instead of the issue of political rivalry, this study emphasizes how ICMI was internalized by the Muslim middle class.

Because Muslims have for so long been politically suppressed and marginalised, and because Islam has been thought of as culturally "backward" and "left behind," the emergence of ICMI clearly meant more than a political achievement. Many Muslim saw ICMI as a symbol of Islamic revival in Indonesia. Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, an Indonesian philosopher, considered the birth of ICMI as very important. For hundreds of years, he noted, Indonesian Muslims, as well as Muslims in other countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Irak, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Algeria, and etc. did not take part in scientific, technological and or economic developments. The development of modern thought, Sutan Takdir remarked, was led by and centered in the West. Indonesia holds the largest population of Muslims in the world (160 million), however, Muslim Indonesia was for many centuries underdeveloped and subject to colonial power. Sutan Takdir expected that ICMI would provide a new situation, new spirit and vitality, and creative thinking (*Pelita*, 24 April 1991). Dawam Rahardjo (1995: 338) noted that "one thing that is often ignored by many in analyzing ICMI is that there was an 'Islamization' process occurring long before ICMI existed". ICMI was only possible, according to Nurcholish Madjid (*Tempo*, 8 December 1990), because of the recent advancement of Islam in Indonesia. Formerly, he noted, there was a gap between the aspiration of Muslim and reality. Through the establishment of ICMI, it was hoped that this gap could be closed. From now on, he says, the *umat Islam* can make a valuable contribution to Indonesian development.

This expectation was seemingly matched by the quality of human resources represented by ICMI activists. The ICMI activists came from the educated middle class produced in the Islamic education boom in the 1970s and 1980s. Mohammad and Sophian wrote:

> In the 1970s, Indonesia was flooded by university graduates. Those who studied for Masters degrees and Ph.D overseas had gone home, they were active in mosque-based religious activities. State university lecturer --many of whom had Ph.Ds--became Islamic preachers like, for instance, Fuad Amsyari at Unair,

A.M. Dsyaifuddin at IPB, Djalaluddin Rahmat at Unpad, and Amin Rais at UGM (*Prospek*, 15 December 1990).

Thus it was not surprising that ICMI was a Muslim organization with the best human resources in Indonesia. The proposal to establish it was supported by around 460 Muslim intellectuals whose signatures were collected by Dawam Rahardjo (*Editor*, 2 February 1991). The symposium of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, held in Malang, East Java, on December 6-8, 1990, at which ICMI was established, was attended by more than 500 Muslim intellectuals. The Minister of Research and Technology, B.J Habibie was elected to be the leader for the first five-year term.

This Islamic resurgence was grounded in the burgeoning educated Muslim middle class. Habibie as head was assisted by a *Dewan Penasehat* (Advisory Board of which seven members were New Order ministers), *Dewan Pakar* (Board of Experts), assistants, secretary, treasury, and 6 departments with 30 divisions. The highest level of the organization, consisted of 120 intellectuals from various groups. The total number of ICMI intellectuals in administration were 137: 17 were core activists, 45 were in the advisory board, 28 were on the board of experts, 30 heads of divisions, and 17 provincial coordinators (*Warta Ekonomi*, 18 February 1991). The intellectuals, scholars, scientists, ministers, high-ranking officials, bureaucrats, businessmen, writers, *ulama* etc. who took part in ICMI were for the most part well-known figures representing a variety of social groups. According to Farid and Luthfie, ICMI tried to accommodate intellectuals from diverse backgrounds (*Prospek*, 23 February 1991).

ICMI paved the way for the identity of the Muslim middle class to be changed from one of 'backwardness' to 'modernity' by providing hope for Muslims to expand their role in the modern global world. According to Marwah Daud, an American university graduate and one of ICMI's member, the image of Islam in Indonesia is changing from 'traditional' to 'modern'. Many Muslim graduates who have come back from studies overseas have reinforced the new image. Formerly, Islam was viewed as "*sarungan*" ("conservative") and Muslims were 'fanatic.' Now they view Islam as universal, open, and cosmopolitan. There are many popular figures who unreservedly admit their Muslim identities. Marwah concluded, "it is the time for us to be proud as Muslims without feeling superior to others" (*Tempo*, 8 December 1990). As quoted by Schwarz (1994:174-175), Umar Juoro,

from the Centre for Information and Development Studies (a think-tank of ICMI) pointed out "there is a new sense of pride in being a Muslim. To be a good Muslim is very mainstream. It is now very acceptable within the elite to study the Qur'an and Islamic theology. Islam is no longer seen as a backward religion." These views were common amongst the urbanized Muslim middle class. There was a tendency to associate ICMI with modernity, and for that reason, the middle class membership of ICMI was overwhelming. In August 1992, ICMI members numbered 11,000, and by March 1993 reached 40,000 members (Liddle 1995: 209), with 75 per cent of them being *sarjana* (university graduates).[26] Hefner also concluded that the emergence of ICMI was a significant indication of the shaping of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia (1993:2).

The idea that the Muslim middle class equated ICMI with modernity can also be seen from their feelings about ICMI's leader, B.J. Habibie. For urbanized Muslims, Habibie was an important symbol in the shifting process from traditional to modern Indonesia. To discover why he was elected and what Habibie meant to the Muslim middle class, it is worth discussing the man himself. Habibie completed his Ph.D in Aeronautical Construction at Rhenisch-Westfaelische Technische Hochschule, Aachen, West Germany, with *summa cum laude*. After completing his study, he was appointed to be a research assistant in the same university. After he moved to Talbot in 1965, he held many important positions such as head of Research and Development of Structure Analysis at Aircraft Industry of MBB (Messerschemitt Boelkow Blohm) in Hamburg. His career sky-rocketed. He became a head of a division and finally, in 1974, became vice-director of technology.

Well aware of Habibie's success in Germany, Soeharto called him home. Soeharto appointed him to be the presidential advisor on advanced technology of Pertamina, a national oil company led by Ibnu Soetowo. In 1976, Habibie was appointed to be the director of aeronautical industry of Nurtanio (later on called IPTN). He established the BPPT (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology). In 1978, he became the Minister of Research and Technology, replacing Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. In 1983, he was elected to be the head of the Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Also in that year, he became the Director of PT Pindad (the Centre of Armed Forces Industry), and in accordance with the Presidential Decree No. 44 1989, he was appointed to be the head of BPIS, a council that

manages ten state-owned 'strategic industries.' In 1989, he was also appointed to be the Director of Otorita Project on Batam island, and PT PAL (a Surabaya-based shipbuilding firm). Altogether, Habibie allegedly lad 23 national companies in strategic industries. His position as the Minister of Research and Technology during the New Order was unchallenged. Habibie was recognized as 'the man with the hi-tech vision for the future' (*Tempo*, 8 December 1990; *Kompas*, 16 December 1990).

Internationally, especially in the Aeronautical field, Habibie was well-recognized. He was a member of the prestigious National Academy of Engineering (US), The Royal Aeronautical Society (England), and Gessellschaft fuer Luft und Raumfahrt (Germany). In 1983, *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* the journal of aeronautic and space, made Habibie "the man of the year." In 1986, similar praise was paid to him by *Aviation International News,* based on the opinion that Habibie had made IPTN a worldclass aircraft company (*Kompas*, 16 December 1990). Additionally, Habibie was also recognized as a devout Muslim.

It should be emphasized that Habibie accomplished all his achievements while the Indonesian Muslim community was still a *"sawah"* society, and when the Muslim middle class was only just emerging. In this situation, Habibie became a symbol of the modern identity of the urban Muslim middle class. Habibie's achievement of producing aircraft and his concern for developing high technology in Indonesia, made him an ideal representative of future Islam as he combined the mastering of hi-tech and religiosity. Pratiknya, a Muslim intellectual and one of ICMI's founders, declared that Habibie was a pious man who had "never neglected" the monday-thursday fasting,[27] and, as an intellectual, he was a man without equal in Indonesia. "Entering the 21th century, technology will dominate. Habibie is the right person to face the future and, for that reason, we chose him to lead ICMI", said Pratiknya (*Tempo*, 8 December 1990). Habibie, for Utomo Danandjaja, a former leader of PII, was the man of the moment at a time when there was a trend towards technology, efficiency, and openness (*Tempo*, 8 December 1990). Emil Salim supported Habibie's becoming the head of ICMI because Habibie complemented the *zeitgeist* surrounding science and technology. He stated that,

> ...we have to ask: why is Islam today associated with economic backwardness? The reason, I think, is that since colonial times Islam has become too de-

> pendent on *fiqih*, its legalistic traditions. This has trivialized the energy of Islamic intellectuals. It is not Islam that is wrong but the teaching of Islam. Instead of emphasizing religious rules and rituals, we need to give more emphasis to science and technology in our teaching. Only in that way can Islam become the religion of progress. That's what ICMI is all about and that's why we picked up Habibie to lead it (Schwarz, 1994: 179).

Discussing Habibie's leadership of ICMI, Azyumardi Azra, a Muslim intellectual graduate of Columbia University, suggests that there must be a redefinition of 'Muslim leader' within the Muslim community. Traditionally, he argued, Muslim leaders were those who came from an Islamic organization within the Muslim community itself. Popular figures who have no such background, though they have a big concern for the fate of the *umat* (Muslim community), are almost never claimed as Muslim leaders. The emergence of ICMI appears to be evidence of this changing definition (*Panji Masyarakat*, 21 December 1990).

Apart from providing an expression of new identity, ICMI was also viewed by the middle class as an organization which would fight for Muslim causes, increase the role of Muslim in the development process, and -- more broadly--work on nation building. Zubaidi, an Indonesian Muslim writer, hoped that ICMI could take a role in forming an intellectual tradition among Indonesian people (Zubaidi, 1991). Utami, a German university graduate, hoped it would stimulate a new 'scientific consciousness' within the Islamic umat by establishing more science-oriented programs (*Media Indonesia*, 3 April 1991). According to Lukman Harun, a former head of the Muhammadiyah and ICMI activist, --regardless of controversy--the birth of ICMI has brought 'a fresh wind' into national life. Considering the many respected intellectuals who participated in the organization, Harun hoped that, ICMI would become a 'storehouse of thinkers.' The Islamic umat, according to him, was still not contributing ideas to the development process, and he hoped ICMI could contribute the centre of Muslim thinking (*Pelita*, 27 March 1991).

In summary, for the urban Muslim middle class, ICMI represented more than just political action. The formation of ICMI, in which a great many Muslim intellectuals participated, is itself evidence of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. Moreover, it has been a symbol of a changing Muslim identity through which the Muslim middle class has identified itself within the modern world.

Islamic Print Media: The Language of Middle Class Discourse

The development of Islam in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s has been indicated by the expansion of publishing by Islamic print media. Some of the most popular publication are: the journal of *Ulumul Qur'an* (UQ), the daily *Republika*, and weekly magazine *Ummat*. *Ulumul Qur'an* was first launched in 1989. Its editor-in-chief was Dawam Rahardjo, a NGO activist and one of the ICMI founders. The editorial board were comprised of Muslim modernists such as Adi Sasono, Quraish Shihab, Sutjipto Wirosardjono, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Haidar Bagir, Azyumardi Azra, Kuntowijoyo and Imaduddin Abdulrahim. Most of these people were linked to the ICMI organization. *Republika* and *Ummat* similarly involve Nurcholish Madjid, Quraish Syihab, Amien Rais, Adi Sasono, Din Syamsuddin, Haidar Bagir and Dawam Rahardjo. The editor-in-chief of *Republika* said that it was intended to publish qualified articles with an Islamic color, professionally organized and placing Islam in a broader context (*Tempo*, 8 January 1993).

What is interesting to note is that these publications, having emerged in the period of Islamic resurgence during the New Order, have similar characteristics: Islamic-oriented, modern, professionally organized, and advocating a 'liberal' understanding of Islam. Their styles of journalism have been clear evidence of the shaping of the educated Muslim middle class in Indonesia. It is from these publications that the 'language of discourse' of the middle class can be identified. In addition to the phenomena of the veil-wearing, Bimbo's *kasidah*, and the formation of ICMI, the establishment of new Muslim media was inseparable from the development of Islam over the last two decades, especially the 'expansion of mass education.' Robert W. Hefner (1997b: 80) stated,

> In Indonesia and other majority-Muslim societies, the expansion of mass education in the aftermath of the Second World War played an important role in facilitating the establishment of new Muslim print media. Mass education created a public eager to consume Islamic works and open to new perspectives on politics and society. These developments also created conditions for the ascent of a new category of religious leader, different in worldview and political commitment from the carefully trained scholars *(ulama)* of traditional Islam.

The focus of UQ was *ilmu dan kebudayaan* (science and culture) as it was published by LSAF (Institution for Religious and Philosophical Studies). Its publication was long waited by the Indonesian

Muslim society. Dawam Rahardjo reported that hundreds of Muslims paid in advance when the journal was still in preparation. In his introduction to the first edition, Rahardjo (1989:1) explained that the establishment of UQ had been inspired by four modern trends occurring in the Muslim world: The first was 'back to the Qur'an.' Many Muslim scholars emphasized the need to understand the Qur'an 'within a new light' *(dengan cahaya baru).* It was felt that in order to capture the *zeitgeist*, Muslims should develop a new paradigm to understand the Qur'an. The second trend was 'the Islamization of science and technology.' The pioneer of this effort was Ismail Al-Faruqi, whose ideas have affected the fields of economics, politics, anthropology, and medicine. The third was the actualization of traditional Islamic sciences, both classic and modern, which had evolved from Muslim scholars in the past. It was felt that Muslim intellectual heritage needed to be reactualized, reappreciated, discovered for its modern relevance, and complemented with the latest developments of knowledge. It was argued that if this was done, modern Islamic civilization will not lose its traditional and historical roots. The last trend reflected a concern with futuristic issues. Many Muslim felt a responsibility to develop Islamic ideas in order to socialize prophetic religious teachings and help save human civilization from global crises. UQ was intended to support these global trends through an artistic, popular and communicative journal. To make a popular journal, UQ was animated with poetry, poems, vignettes, calligraphy, short-stories, and essays on culture. Although creativity and critical thinking were important concern, spiritual depth was emphasized.

Compared to other existing Muslim publications, Hefner (1997b: 90) pointed out that *Ulumul Qur'an* was "Indonesia's most respected liberal journal (of a loosely neomodernist persuasion)." Its liberality can be seen from the following traits: *first*, UQ challenged the Muslim establishment in Indonesia in regards to its understanding of Islam. This was seen from UQ's support of the Islamic renewal movement that was pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid. Second, *UQ* initiated religious dialogue among various Muslim groups. This was done by exposing issues of religious plurality and publishing non-Muslim articles, even at the expense of criticism from some segments of its readership. Third, UQ changed the image of conventional Islamic media, which had previously maintained, that *dakwah* should be performed in the normative religious language. By emphasizing objectivity, UQ declared that Islam is open to criticism. These UQ's traits

were not found previously in the conventional Islamic media of the 1980s.

Ulumul Qur'an also explored wide-ranging themes such as science and technology, the Islamization of science, futuristic Islam, orientalism, religious literature, the mosaic of traditional Islam, sufism or Islamic mysticism, Islam and postmodernism, Islamic renewal, religiosity, Islamic development in the West, Islamic philosophy, human rights, feminism, etc.[28] These rich topics "have earned *Ulumul Qur'an* a reputation as one of the most courageously experimental journals in the Muslim world." (Hefner 1997b: 90)

In a time when Muslim media were defined as media for Muslim writers and readers, UQ boldly published non-Muslim writers including Christian thinkers, Franz Magnis Suseno and Victor Tanja. The journal received much strident criticism when it published an article written by American political scientist, R. William Liddle, who was labelled as "*yahudi*" (Jewish), "orientalis"(orientalist)[29] and "hostile" to Islam.[30] In this regard, editor-in-chief, Dawam Rahardjo, explained that UQ was an academic journal. Thus, it was open to anyone including non-Muslim writers. Articles of non-Islamic orientation were intended for comparative perspective. Dawam stated that the journal even accept articles by non-Muslim who criticized the ideas of Muslim writers as was done by Frans Magnis Suseno. As the journal supported harmony amongst religions, Suseno's criticism of Muslims was considered worthwhile for provoking introspection. (Rahardjo 1993: 1).

Like *Ulumul Qur'an*, the daily *Republika* (launched in 1993) and the popular Muslim weekly *Ummat* (released in 1995) were long awaited addition to modern Islamic media. After the Muslim community experienced the boom in education, their tastes changed. They imagined media which could cater to their changing tastes. It was in this context that *UQ, Republika* and *Ummat* were founded. In the eight months after it was launched on 4 January 1993, *Republika* succeeded in selling 1.3 million shares to its readers at Rp. 5,000 per share (*Detik*, 1-7 September 1993). This sale of share to the public was apparently a new phenomenon in the history of Indonesian press because up till this point, the share ownership was monopolized by capital investors and press staff.

These three publications also had a number of similar traits. They attempted to represent a wide range of opinion within the Muslim community. Unlike *Media Dakwah*, *Risalah*, *Hidayatullah*, *Suara*

Masjid, *Al-Muslimun*, and other conventional Muslim publications, *Republika* and *Ummat* included reports on film stars and media celebrities. Celebrity reporting is extremely unusual for Muslim media. Criticizing *Republika* and *Ummat*, *Media Dakwah* wrote that celebrity reporting contributed to the moral perplexity rampant in Indonesian society. However, as described by Hefner,

> Editors at *Republika* and *Ummat* counter these criticisms by emphasizing that their publications are intended not just for political stalwarts or the deeply pious, but for individuals who are still uncertain in their faith and uncomfortable with moral stridency. These editors see their missions in Indonesian society in terms quite different from those of *Media Dakwah*. In a country still haunted by memories of religious trauma, they say, their charge is to reassure citizens that Islam is modern, tolerant, and in tune with modern concerns. As one of the *Republika's* editors observed in January 1997, "The people at *Media Dakwah* believe that if something is not approved in the Qur'an or Sunnah it is forbidden. But why should this be so? God made us with minds to inquire and explore. We feel that if something is not explicitly forbidden then it is acceptable to explore it." Thus *Republika* and *Ummat* feature regular stories on the arts, television, literature, and fashion trends of interest to middle- and upper-middle class Muslims who comprise their readership. (1997b: 90)

On April 17, 1995 and on December 30, 1996, groups of Muslims gathered in front of *Republika*'s office in Jakarta to protest the newspaper (*Sinar*, 22 April 1995). At issue was a supplement known as the "Friday Dialogue," which was devoted to the "exploration of new, alternative, or special-interest issues in Islam" (Hefner 1997b: 98). On March 31, 1995, this supplement included a two-page reflection on the life and thought of Ahmad Wahib. Ahmad Wahib was a young independent-minded activist who lived in the 1960s. His book, entitled *Revolusi Pemikiran Islam* (Revolution of Islamic Thought), published in 1982 was taken from his diary. It contained critical reflections of his frustrations with religious life in his time. Though he came from a Madurese *santri* family, "Wahib's diary abounds with expressions of doubt about the mission of the Prophet, the proper meaning of the Qur'an, and the intellectual integrity of *ulama* ... after every one of his introspective crises of faith, Wahib always returns to decisive affirmation of Islam ... his statements of *angst* are so severe that they shocked some of Indonesian's leading *ulama*, several of whom publicly expressed their 'regret' that the book has been published" (Hefner 1997b: 98).

Muslims who protested at the demonstration against *Republika* on April 17, 1995 asserted that Wahib 'had insulted Islam, the Qur'an,

the Prophet, and God.' In some pages of Wahib's book he concluded that "there is no Islamic law, there is only the history of Muhammad" (p. 60); "the Qur'an contains many passages that are no longer used" (p. 38); and "the Qur'an is not identical with Islam." For the protesters, "Wahib, who had lived for a while in a Christian boarding house when a student in Yogyakarta, had been influenced by ideas from 'Jews, Christians, philosophers and [Javanist] mysticism," (Hefner 1997b: 98) and the reporters should be dismissed and fired.

The Muslim protest on December 30, 1996 was a condemnation of *Republika*'s act of wishing "Selamat Hari Natal" (Merry Christmas) to the Christian community of Indonesia. For the demonstrators, to wish Christians a Holy Christmas was akin to justifying Christian belief, and was thus prohibited (Hefner 1997b: 99). In short, in many cases, for the demonstrators, Republika was "too cosmopolitan, prone to celebrity-mongering, and insensitive of Islamic morality" (Hefner 1997b: 99).

What can be seen from the emergence of these new Muslim publications with their liberal characteristics is that mass education in Indonesia during the New Order prompted an expansion of intellectual discourse. Mass education caused the emergence of a new generation of educated Muslims who are critical, objective, and support modern values such as plurality, openness, democracy, and moderation. William Liddle (1995: 210) pointed out that, in general, the theological and political perspective supported by the Muslim middle class were rather moderate. Sermon deliveries both in urban and village mosques tended to emphasize harmony amongst religious followers. Liddle pointed to the Islamic magazine, *Amanah*, as an example of this tendency. This popular monthly family magazine instructed the readers how to be good Muslims while enjoying a modern life-style.

As the *santri*, the Muslim middle class attempted to integrate Islam into the modern world. The creation of *Ulumul Qur'an*, *Ummat* and *Republika* effectively exposed new Islamic intellectual discourse to the general public. The new educated generation, critical and independent-minded but moderate in understanding and internalizing religion, were no longer satisfied by conservative Muslim media, which through normative language only instructed people on what is *halal* (allowed) and what is *haram* (forbidden) by their religion. What was felt to be needed was critical, open and informative media that could increase the quality of the Muslim community. *Republika* staff believed that "their newspaper has to demonstrate that it is tol-

erant, plural, and modern, as well as pious and critical. In other words, the 'cosmopolitan' for which *Media Dakwah* faults *Republika* is just that: an effort to show that Islam is not just a matter for villagers and *ulama*, but a religion that can inspire a social conscience consonant with popular aspirations for openness, pluralism, and informed sophistication" (Hefner 1997b: 97). The success of *Ulumul Qur'an*, *Ummat* and *Republika* indicate the changing tastes of the new Muslim middle class. To meet their concerns about pluralism, openness and democracy, these new Muslim publication sought "to demonstrate their independence, reach across religious lines, and the fashions, controversies." (Hefner 1997b: 96)

In addition to the other class codes discussed earlier, the emergence of *Ulumul Qur'an*, *Ummat* and *Republika* has provided clear evidence of the formation of the Indonesian during the New Order period. The media expression of the Muslim middle class's aspiration has reinforced the previous codes shown by veil wearing, Bimbo's *kasidah*, and the establishment of ICMI. As symbols pointing to class formation, codes of class such as dress, language, taste, ideology, etc., can be altered or discarded in response to social change.

The Elite's Prestigious Pengajian*: Meeting God in Hotels*

Since the 1980s, Indonesia's biggest cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya, have been overwhelmed by a new wave of religious revival. This can be seen by increasing numbers of Islamic study groups (*kelompok pengajian*). Many participants in such groups come from the middle and even elite classes. Religious instruction is conducted not only in the mosques but in prestigious hotels, and in government and private business offices.

Several successful businessmen such as Abdul Latief, the owner of Pasaraya Mall and director of Sarinah Jaya, and Ahmad Ganis, the director of PT Radiant Utama, cooperated with Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo and Fahmi Idris to establish a religious study group called Paramadina in 1986. At the inaugural meeting of this group held on the 6th floor of the Sarinah Jaya Building, it was announced that the activities would consisted of "enjoying Jakarta's night, scene, enjoying cuisine, listening to piano music and then listening to a religious talk" (*Tempo,* 3 January 1987). Since then, Paramadina, headed by Nurcholish Madjid, has been joined by hundreds of middle class people, high-ranking government officials, businessmen and other members of the elite class. Although Paramadina provides courses in

Islamic thought and Islamic philosophy, the most popular have been the *tasawuf* (Islamic mysticism) programs. According to Buddy Munawar Rahman, the director of the educational division of Paramadina, "this was because the participants need not only religious knowledge, but also need to know how to apply it in their daily life."

On September 15, 1997, at the News Cafe in the Setiabudi Building, Kuningan Jakarta, 400 people attended a seminar on "Kebangkitan Spiritualitas Baru" (The Rise of the New Spirituality) which discussed James Redfield's popular novel, *The Celestine Prophecy.* The speakers were astronomist Karlina Leksono, sociologist Ignas Kleden, and popular artist Oppie Andarista. At the same time, at Plaza Bapindo in Jalan Sudirman, there was also a seminar entitled "Relevansi Kehidupan Tasawuf dalam Kehidupan Modern" (The Relevance of Islamic Mysticism in Modern Life). The seminar was conducted by Keluarga Pengajian Sehati (The Family 'Of One Vision Religious Learning) led by Sri Adyanti B.N. Rachmadi, a daughter of the former Indonesian vice president, Soedharmono. Around 500 people participated. The speakers included various prominent figures like novelist Emha Ainun Nadjib, Muslim intellectual Djalaluddin Rahmat, and Dr. Said Agil Siraj, a NU leader. At that meeting, Soedharmono inaugurated "Pusat: Kajian Tasawuf" or The Centre for Islamic Mysticism Studies. *(Ummat,* 15 September 1997).

In January 1999, 50 executives from various companies participated in a program called *"Pesantren Eksekutif.'* (Religious Training for Executives) held at Bandung Giri Gahana Golf & Resor in Jatinangor, Bandung, West Java. For three days they purified their hearts and meditated for a better future. This program was conducted by PT Bimantara Citra, a big company owned by Bambang Triatmodjo, the son of former president, Soeharto. This program has been held every Ramadhan for three years. Each participant paid Rp 350.000 for accommodations. In 1999, out of 110 executives who applied for the program, only 50 were accepted. According to Restyarto, the head of this *Pesantren Eksekutif* program, the number of participants was limited by the hotel capacity. Similar programs were held in several hotels in Jakarta such as the Hotel Hilton, Senayan from January 8th, 1999. There, each executive paid Rp 950.000 for the three-day event (*Gatra,* 23 January 1999).

According to Djono Draptono, an executive who works in the budgeting division of PT Indosat, participating in the *Pesantren*

Eksekutif provides interesting experiences. This kind of program, he points out, "is able to inspire anyone to remember Allah, regardless of their work demands. The intensity of religious commitment is sometimes up and sometimes down, but after joining the religious program, hopefully, this intensity remains stable" (*Gatra*, 23 January 1999).

Another common study group is called *Majelis Taklim* (Regular Meeting for Religious Deepening). There are hundreds of *majelis taklim* in Jakarta. The *majelis taklim* of Asy-Syafiiyah is led by Tuty Alawiyah, the former Minister for Women's Affairs. In every meeting, hundreds of people from different professions and backgrounds take part. The *majelis taklim* of Attahiriyah is led by Suryani Thahir, an Egyptian university graduate, has organized 60 groups of *majelis taklim.* One of them has been held every Friday since 1971 at her home in Cakung, Jakarta (*Ummat*, 21 December 1998).

According to Randi Pangkahila, a head of the division of health and accidents in PT Asuransi Cigna, religion is very important, especially for professional decision makers. "Religion," says Pangkahila, "provides a perfect surveillance system so businessmen do not break business ethics . . . The opportunity to break the law is open to everybody. The best control is one's conscience, and that is where religion is important" (*Ummat,* 4 January 1999). Ahmad Fuad Afdhal, a director of PT Awal Fajar Adicita, said that although he thought it was still formalistic, "I have become accustomed to opening the office meeting with prayer such as reciting *surah al-Fatihah* of the Qur'an" (*Ummat*, 4 January 1999).

Describing her experience in *tasawuf*, Sri Adyanti pointed out that in Indonesia, religion was studied ritualistically without emphasizing the meaning behind it. In her view, children often refuse to perform *shalat* (five time daily prayers) because they do not understand its real meaning. She asserted that *Shalat* is actually our need and joy. To change the view of *shalat* from one of obligation to one of need and joy is very hard, although it can be understood through *tasawuf.* In *tasawuf* one's soul is thought to be cleansed and reawakened in order to come near to God. After being cleansed, Sri Adyanti expressed her feeling that God is in fact very close (*Tiras*, 26 January 1998).

Dana Iswara, a popular news presenter of RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia) now studying Southeast Asian politics at the Australian National University in Canberra, carried out weekly *pengajian*

keluarga (family religious learning sessions) and attended monthly *pengajian* lectured by Quraish Shihab, a prominent Muslim scholar and a former rector of State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta. She has visited Mecca for pilgrimage three times in 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively. For Iswara, religion is self-control, and therefore very important. Through deepening religion, she felt that at work she always endeavored to be honest, positive and not involved in unfair competition. "I am always aware," she concludes, "that everything I have got is principally because of God's blessing. You see . . . everything in life comes from God, so there is no reason for us to be arrogant to other people."[31]

This phenomenon of religious revival among the middle class in Indonesia which began in the 1980s, has clearly proved the weakness of the secularization thesis espoused by many social scientists with regard to modern societies. Secularization theory supporters such as Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (1965), and Bryan Wilson with his work *Secularization: the Inherited Model* (1985), both describe the end of religion in modern times, whereby a religionless society or secular world emerge as religion collapses. When modern science and high technology were thought capable of addressing all human problems and achieving things that were formerly unimaginable, proponents of modernization theory argued that religion is only a matter of illusion.

Concomitant with the dominance of technology, many came to think of modern society as the master of its world and environment. "If the Greeks perceived the cosmos as an immensely expanded polis, and medieval man saw it as the feudal manor enlarged to infinity, we," Harvey Cox (1965: 1) stated, "experience the universe as the city of man." Because the world has become humanity's task, humanity's responsibility, and nearly all aspects of nature are explored by people, God's or gods' role has gradually been replaced by that of human. AS was argued by Peursen (1963: 16):

> In a secularized world, there is no longer an ontological way of thinking about higher . . . metaphysical beings . . . Now we are liberated from all these unreal supernatural entities . . . Only that which is directly related to us is real. Things do not exist in themselves; they are no longer substances, but they exist in and for the sake of what they do with us and what we do with them.

In accordance with this growing secularization, "the collapse of traditional religion or religious values was considered the 'hallmark'

of the modern era" (Cox 1965:1). Bryan Wilson (1985: 19) noted that secularization is the process whereby domains of social activity and human experience previously organized around religious norms are "desacralized" by their interpretation in terms of ideals and practices of a less directly sacral nature. He added,

> The secularization thesis implies the privatization of religion; its continuing operation in the public domain becomes confined to a lingering rhetorical invocation in support of conventional morality and human decency and dignity —as a cry of despair in the face of moral panic.

However, with the advent of the "postmodern" era, social scientists are also shocked by the fact that, in some places, modern people are in fact renewing their religious consciousness. At the dawn of the third millennium there are signs of a worldwide religious revival. The process of secularization, according to Robert N. Bellah (1958: 1-5), "does not mean that religion disappears. The function of religion in a principal society is different from that in prescriptive but it is not necessary less important." Revising his previous theory and viewing religious revival in the postmodern era, Cox (1984: 20) noted,

> The problem is that the world of declining religion to which my earlier book was addressed has begun to change in ways that few people anticipated. A new age that some call the 'postmodern' has begun to appear. No one is quite sure just what the postmodern era will be like, but one thing seems clear. Rather than an age of rampant secularization and religious decline, it appears to be more of an era of religious revival and the return of the sacral.

Secularization tends to occurs only in societies dominated by modern scientific values. In this kind of society, a *terra incognita* provides the initiative to observe and discover the secrets and mysteries of the universe. Modern societies have answered this challenge by way of observation and research. The result has been that the spread of science and technology that has occurred in western civilization prompted many to ignore traditional religious teachings. In certain societies, industrialization led to secularization, but in other societies, generally in Muslim countries, this has not happened, but rather, religious awareness has grown. It may be for this reason that Gellner (1992: 18) concluded that Islam is the "great exception" to secularization. Among the world's core civilizations, Islam "totally and effectively defies the secularization thesis".

> It is possible to disagree about the extent, homogeneity, or irreversibility of this trend [i.e., secularization] ...but, by and large, it would seem reasonable to say that it is real. But there is one of very real, dramatic and conspicuous exception to all this: Islam. To say that secularization prevails in Islam is not contentious. It is simply false. Islam is as strong now as it was a century ago. In some ways, it is probably much stronger (Gellner, 1992: 5).

In the case of Islam, religiousity has not been threatened by the process of modernization and industrialization, and has even strengthened. This process of strengthening has been experienced by the Muslim middle class in contemporary Indonesia. Instead of secularizing society, the process of modernization in Indonesia has in fact strengthened religious orientation. This phenomenon is characterized by the emergence of many religious movements in Indonesian cities, which have experienced modernization and development. The religious activities of the wealthy and educated in Indonesia's large cities, however, are not merely evidence of a religious resurgence proving the failure of the secularization thesis, but more importantly provide identity reinforcement for the growing Muslim middle class. Class codes that underpin religious resurgence, such as the wearing of veil, the development of modern Islamic music, the success of Muslim media, the emergence of ICMI, and the proliferation of religious study groups, tend to reinforce each other. Unwittingly, all of these urban religious activities became cultural representations of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia during the period of the New Order.

Endnotes

1. Geertz in his 1950s anthropological study of Mojokuto, a small town in East Java, divided Javanese Muslims into three cultural categories: *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan*. The *santri* consists of Muslims who strictly carry out the Islamic doctrines in their daily activities, in other words, they are the pious Muslims. Economically, they were commonly local businessmen and petty traders. The *abangan* are Muslim by birth but only of nominal persuasion. Their worldview and daily activities strongly reflect the Hindu-Buddhist tradition. Their religious practices are "animist" and "mystical." Between the two, Geerts puts the *priyayi*. (see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* 1960). However, the *santri* and the *abangan* are cultural categories, and the *priyayi* is actually a social stratification category. They are the elite class in Javanese society. The *priyayi* should not be considered between *the santri* and *the abangan* but above them. In other words, beneath the *priyayi* should not be *abangan* or *santri* but *wong cilik* (the little people). Thus, the *priyayi* could actually be *abangan* or *santri* (see Emmerson 1976: 24). However, given the historical fact that by the 1980s most of the New Order elite were *abangan*, the *priyayi* have long been identified as *abangan*. In terms of political interest the *abangan* and *santri* were opposed to each other. Soeharto and the circle of the New Order elite around him who dominated the government by 1985 is defined here as *abangan* given the fact that they opposed Islamic political interests. Consequently, in political analysis, the *abangan* are excluded from the *santri* and not grouped as 'Muslims.' The *santri* refers to the Muslim politicians and activists who support Islamic development and Islamic interests in the New Order state, although there are other Muslims who disagree with the mission. This group I variously call 'Muslims,' 'Islam,' 'Islamic umat,' 'Muslim community,' or 'Muslim group." All of these terms are used interchangeably. The *abangan* are the supporters of Javanese culture, values and secular nationalism, although not all secular nationalism supporters are *abangan*.
2. The Soekarno and Soeharto governments had a similar authoritarian nature. Since the 1945 independence, according to Taufik Abdullah, the only genuine democracy experienced by Indonesians was during the years from 1950 to 1957. More than 30 political parties took part in the 1955 election. From Soekarno's Guided Democracy until the fall of Soeharto (a period of 40 years), Indonesians were ruled by authoritarian regimes. See interview with Taufik Abdullah, *Republika*, 16 Augusts 1998.
3. PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) was a Sumatra-based rebel movement against the government. It began on 15 February 1958 with its headquarters at Bukittinggi, and aimed to become free of Jakarta's administration. Syafruddin was its Prime Minister and Mohammad Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Simbolon were cabinet ministers. Two days after the announcement of the rebellion, the Sulawesi-based rebels, *Permesta*, joined the PRRI. After that the movement was known as the PRRI/Permesta revolt (see Ricklefs 1981: 250). The government version of the PRRI incident can be found in the special publication written by an army leader during that time (Darmosugondo 1958: 18, 51).
4. Masyumi, an abbreviation from *Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesian* (Deliberation Body of Indonesian Muslims), was an *"avant-garde"* of Indonesian democracy (Maarif 1993: 112). The founders and leaders of this party were leading

Indonesian Muslim figures, western educated and prominent protagonists of democracy. Ali (1996: 215) even described Natsir as a "'Father' of Indonesian first generation Muslim intellectuals who experienced 'enlightenment' from the western intellectual tradition, from whom the new generation of Muslim intellectuals such as Deliar Noer, Nurcholish Madjid, M. Dawam Rahardjo, M. Amien Rais and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, to mention a few Muslim intellectuals, should learn from." Ali argues that seen from this perspective, Natsir was "a representation of a great figure who embraced two civilizations (Islam and the West) to his own self and chose Islam as his fundamental basis of life by using western tradition as his tool of methodology to interpret reality." (1996: 215) Thus, the dissolution of the party was a great event and a tragedy within the Muslim community at that time.

5. Prominent figures like Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap were detained in jail from 1961 to 1967. Besides them, there were in 1962 also some other prominent Muslims not involved in the PRRI who were jailed. They were the General Chairman of Masyumi: Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohammad Roem, M. Yunan Nasution, E.Z. Muttaqien, K.H. Isa Anshary, Hamka, Ghazali Sjahlan, Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo, Kiyai A. Mukti, S, Soemarsono, Djanamar Adjam etc. Eventually it was proved that they were all wrongly detained (Noer, 1987: 410).
6. Soekarno himself had reasons to dislike Muslims. Having said that they opposed him politically, the 'Muslim groups' were also seen to have rebelled both against the unity of the Indonesian state and against his position (see Horikoshi 1975; Dijk 1981).
7. Ali Murtopo was the head of OPSUS (Operasi Khusus), a special operations intelligence bureau linked to the Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) that was very powerful in the 1970s. During the first year of the New Order, Ali Murtopo was one of President Soeharto's two closest aides (Robison 1986: 148-152). He was known as a Chinese Catholic and was amongst Soeharto's most trusted advisers. Together with his Catholic alliance, in 1970, he established the CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies). This alliance were responsible for having developed the strategies behind the 1971 elections and the formation of Golkar. Most important of all, Murtopo and his alliance were responsible for fierce treatment and restrictions on Muslims and other political parties in 1973 (Ward 1974; Boland 1971: 150-153). The political climate at the beginning of the New Order was characterized by the tension amongst Muslims, secular-national, and Catholic-socialist alliances.
8. The sense of being a minority is ironic if one traces what Muslims have contributed to national independence movements from the colonial period up until the elimination of the Communist party in the New Order period. 19th century Indonesian history shows us that Islamic ideology-based resistance movement against Western colonialism were significant, ranging from the Java War (1825 - 1830), the Aceh War (1873 - 1908), the revolt of Banten peasants in 1888, K.H. Zaenal Mustafa rebels in Tasikmalaya, the Tjimareme Revolt in 1917, and many small scale rebellions. For studies of the 19th century rebellions against Dutch Colonialism, see Kartodirdjo (1966, 1978). Grounded in this 19th century base, Islam has been, as Kahin argued, "one of the most important factors contributing to the growth of an integrated nationalism [which in turn facilitated] the high degree of religious homogeneity that prevailed in Indonesia, over 90 per

cent of the population being Mohammedan." (1952: 38). The "religious homogeneity" was an effective vehicle for nationalist movements. For Kahin, it was important not only as a common bond, but because it provided "a sort of symbols as against an alien intruder and oppressor of a different religion." See Kahin 1952, esp. Chapter II, pp. 37 -63.

9. For a description, as quoted by Ali from Wertheim (1956) and Feith (1958: 32), five years before independence (1940), Indonesia had merely 240 Senior High School (SMA) graduates, and only a small number of subscribers to Indonesian, Dutch and Chinese newspapers.
10. It is worth explaining the use of the term *middle class* in this study. The 'middle class', as discussed in this paper, refers to a social class which has gone through the transformation from the lower to the intermediate or middle class thanks to the educational advancement, social changes and rapid economic development that have taken place during the New Order period. As Weber defines a class in capitalist society, these Indonesian middle class members are bound not only by their economic characteristics, but also their occupational position, common status, prestige, and political power. (see Haralambos and Holborn 1995: 36-38) It is in this sense that in the large cities of Indonesia "a new middle class was taking shape" (Dick 1990: 96-122). They are reformist academics, intellectuals, lawyers, political and cultural figures, state technocrats, NGO activists, popular entertainers, Muslim preachers and reformers, and economic commentators (Robison 1993: 60). The shaping of this new middle class was accompanied by the rise of religious devotion. Vatikiotis (1996:152-53) witnessed this phenomenon: "In Indonesia the revival of Islamic devotion in the 1980s and 1990s has been a largely urban and middle class phenomenon —the segment of society most affected by social and economic change. Partly this phenomenon can be attributed to the increasing number of Muslim devotees who are joining the ranks of the urban middle class." Thanks to the economic growth and the increase of the quality of education during the New Order, Indonesia has a great deal of skilled manpower, managers, trained workers and technicians, highly dedicated teachers and lecturers, and other qualified human resources (Anwar 1995: 120). All these things support the proliferation of a well educated middle class that is ready to enter a broad range of work fields. "With their professions, a well educated middle class becomes the core of bureaucracy, and also spreads out in private sectors" (Nakamura 1993: 12-13). It is in this sense that Hefner (1993, 1997a), Kuntowijoyo (1993), Budiman (1994), Ramage (1995), and many others, broadly use and discuss the contemporary Indonesian middle class of which Muslims are a large part.
11. Various responses and point of views have surrounded the establishment of ICMI. For scholars like Hefner, Nakamura, Ramage, Budiman, and ICMI activists and protagonists such as Kuntowijoyo, Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, and Amien Rais, ICMI is nothing but the symbol of Muslim political awakening or the way of entry for Muslims to become the core players after decades of being the outsiders. To others —the so-called secular analysts, like Liddle and Wahid— ICMI is merely Soeharto's way of co-opting the increasing Muslim power for his support in the 1992 election. They predicted that once Soeharto won the election and continued his next term of office, ICMI would be ignored and would lose its power (see Liddle 1996a; Schwarz 1994). The secularists viewed ICMI as nothing but a vehicle for certain political

interests (e.g. the government position or the establishing of an Islamic state), particularly for those "radical modernist" Muslims.

12. It is worth adding that this does not mean that the Muslim middle class is entirely a New Order phenomenon. The emergence of *Syarikat Islam* (SI) with hundreds of thousands followers in the 1910s that was concerned with a populist economy, and *Jong Islamiten Bond* (JIB), a Muslim youth organization in the 1920s with prominent leaders such as K.H. Agus Salim, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto, Syamsuridjal and the like, could also be regarded as Muslim middle class phenomena. However, the middle class as discussed in this study is a class which brings about large-scale Islamization without historical precedence and which resulted in widespread religious intensification. If the early 20th century Muslim middle class was based in organizations of communities, the middle class of today is a national phenomena underpinned by the progress of Muslim education and rapid economic development that in turn facilitated the increase of Muslim influence in Indonesian politics.
13. See "Rindu Kehidupan Zaman Masyumi," *Majalah Amanah's* interview with Nurcholish Madjid , 11-24 January 1993 or Madjid (1998). Similar to Nurcholish, Rahardjo (1993: 329) also stated that "the big harvest" of educated santri middle class only took place in the 1970s: "They initially entered the government [as civil servants] and became lecturers in universities through the patronage of their seniors. Some of them also entered the business world as professionals. In that process, the dichotomy santri-abangan started to break down, both in perception or social reality. In the 1980s, they then occupied higher positions in the bureaucracy and became managers in companies."
14. Geertz used the term "bazaar economy" to describe the petty trading that became the source of entrepreneurship for the later modern economy. According to Mahasin, the bazaar economy "seems to record no more than a betrayed hope. The State sector remains dominant in the economy, and the private sector is largely in the hands of monopolistic Chinese and a handful of client businessman. There seems to be no way for the bazaar economy to lift itself and be transformed into a firm-type economy" (Mahasin 1984: 140).
15. Even so, many Muslim scholars believe that we have not yet seen the real Islamic awakening. What is now occurring is just a symbolization of Islam in terms of political aims. ICMI is only a symbol of the awakening of Muslim political interest. However, this symbol has in fact played an important role in how Muslims, who were used to being outsiders, now identify themselves as being within the state.
16. The influence of *gerakan jilbabisasi* (the 'veilization' movement) that began at Salman mosque and spread to senior high school (SMA) students in Bandung was overwhelming because the main participants of the weekly *mentoring* programs were students from popular SMAs in Bandung such as SMA 3, SMA 5, SMA 4, SMA 2, and SMA 6. Having been socialized in Salman, these students wore the veil outside of the mosque. To begin with, a few head-scarved schoolgirls were seen in SMA 3, 4, and 5 in Bandung. In years to come —after the *remaja masjid* (students of mosque activists) organizations like the Salman's *Karisma* and then RISMA (Muslim Students Association of Sunda Kelapa Mosque) in Jakarta were widely recognized and established in many urban mosques— head-scarved schoolgirls were also visible at SMAs in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Jember, Solo, Pekalongan, Surabaya, Ambon, and Ujung Pandang. In short, in the 1980s,

the wearing of the veil was a nationwide movement even though it was still marginal compared to total numbers of SMA students throughout the country. This spread worried the government. The head-scarved shoolgirls experienced government coercion such as school intimidation and exclusion from classes and examinations because their head-scarves were against the government's uniform regulations. The government through the Director General of PDM (Primary and Secondary Education), Dardji Darmodihardjo, released Decree No. 052/C/Kep/D.82 concerned with "Pedoman Pakaian Seragam Sekolah" (A Guide for School Uniforms) for students of junior and senior high schools (SMP and SMA), containing a prohibition of Islamic style dress at schools. As a result, "hundreds of students were excluded from popular state schools in Bandung, Cirebon, Pekalongan, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Ambon" (*Media Dakwah*, 10 April 1985). Soon, this decree attracted stormy protests and the affair of the veil became a national debate. Parents in many cities condemned the government as having broken human rights in terms of religious expression and acting contradictory to national institutions (Pancasila and UUD 1945) which guarantee free religious expression. On the 10th of September 1984, Islamic organizations such as the MUI (Indonesian Ulama Organization), and DDII (Indonesian Council of Islamic Preaching) protested the government's decree and demanded the adoption of Islamic aspirations. In a court case concerning veil wearing at SMA 68 Jakarta, Prof. Ibrahim Hosein from the MUI tried to persuade the government by saying that the veil was purely a religious affair, clearly ordered in the Koran in Surah An-Nur verse 31 and al-Ahzab verse 59 which state that the veil is obligatory for Muslim women (*Tempo*, 1 July 1989). This was followed by the protest declaration of Islamic student organizations in West Java including the Association of Muslim University Student (HMI), Indonesian Muslim Student (PII), the Association of Muhammadiyah Student (IMM), the Movement of Muslim Youth (GPI) etc. (*Media Dakwah*, 10 October, 1984). As the Muslim demand grew stronger and the number of Islamic dress supporters increased more and more, the ideological orientation of Muslims has disappeared thanks to the deideologization process occurring since the beginning of the 1980s. Finally, in 1989, the government released a final decree which officially permitted the veil in state schools.

17. Due to its universal message, tender rhythm, and in the absence of subtle religious music amid rapid social change, the song became very popular. Many people in Indonesia recognize this song. According to Sam, its writer, "Tuhan" was once declared as a compulsory song to be performed in a festival held by all Churches of Jakarta.
18. Interview with Acil May 26, 1999.
19. I define secular music here as music which is related only to this worldly life, particularly in its lyrics. It is music for the sake of music, commodity, commercialism, industry, or fun. Secular music is any music in which the lyrics are not dedicated to religiosity, or do not call on the importance of religion, spirituality and moral values, do not remind us of the temporary world and the life hereafter.
20. Among the Indonesian musicians who have achieved success so far, apparently only great composers like Ismail Marzuki, Cornel Simanjuntak, W.R. Supratman and others have successfully shown a sense of "Indonesianness." Also, there are only a few ethnic musical groups (Sundanese, Javanese, Ambonese, Medanese

etc.) who can claim to be performing Indonesian music.

21. Interview with Acil May 26, 1999.
22. Interview with Acil, May 26, 1999.
23. See chapter I.
24. However, for many political analysts, the long process of Islamization is apparently invisible. This view has resulted in various interpretations of the ICMI formation. There are at least five points of view on the meaning of this organization: *First*, those who see it as a phenomenon of the Islamization of bureaucracy *(santrinisasi birokrasi)*. This opinion is common among ICMI activists and protagonists like Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, Imaduddin, Amien Rais etc. *Second*, those who think of it as a 'bureaucratization' of Islam, accompanied by elitization of the *santri*. This is discussed in Fachry Ali's article entitled *"Keharusan Demokratisasi dalam Islam Indonesia"* (The Necessity of Democratization within Indonesian Islam), a paper presented in a program of "Pidato Politik dan Dialog Akhir Tahun MASIKA-ICMI 1994," (Political Speeches and the End of the Year Dialogue of MASIKA-ICMI) in LIPI, December 28, 1994. *Third*, are those who view ICMI as a symptom of the emergence of religious sectarianism, although even before ICMI there were ISKA (Association of Catholic Scholars), FCHI (The Forum of Indonesian Hinduist Intellectuals) and KCBI (A Group of Indonesian Bhuddist Intellectuals). Moreover, this group sees that ICMI has been dominated by modernist Islamists who planned to build an Islamic state. This view is held by Abdurrahman Wahid, the current president. *Fourth*, are those who interpret ICMI as the New Order state's co-opting of Islamic power. ICMI, this group believe, was only a means for Soeharto to control Muslim political activists. Thus, it is only a tool for attaining political support in facing the 1992 general election and his next term of office. This line of thinking was clearly expressed by Liddle (see Liddle 1996) and Abdurrahman Wahid (see Schwarz 1994). *Fifth*, are those who describe the emergence of ICMI as an indication of the shape of the Muslim middle class. This group includes Robert Hefner (1993,1997a), Nakamura (1993), Douglas Ramage (1995), Kuntowijoyo (1991), and Budiman (1994).
25. Interview with Yudi Latif, a young ICMI activist, 6 May 1999.
26. Besides Ramadhan fasting, Muslims are also urged to perform different types of "voluntary" fasting. One type is called "Puasa Senin-Kamis" (fasting every Monday and Thursday) as the Prophet Muhammad s.a.w. had done.
27. The journal also exposed controversial issues in the Muslim world. UQ exposed Nurcholish Madjid's Islamic renewal movement (No.1, Vol. IV Th. 1993). In this article, Nurcholish controversially translated the word *"Islam"* in the Qur'anic verse, *"Inna al-dîn 'inda-Allâh-i al-Islâm"* (The only religion acceptable by God is Islam)," so as it open the possibility of the inclusion of non-Muslim. This word, according to Nurcholish, originally referred to those who sincerely submitted and accepted the truth of God and followed His way. This was said to be the religion of the Prophet Abraham who is believed to be the father of monotheism. Abraham in the Qur'an is deemed not *"Muslim"* but he who "submitted" or "surrendered" to the truth of God. *Muslim,* thus, according to Nurcholish, actually means not only the 'Muslims' but possibly Christians, Jews, and whoever believes in God and sincerely submits to His instructions. This view subverted the established theological belief amongst Muslims in Indonesia and consequently Nurcholish became the target of huge strident criticism from

those who refused his ideas. The most "harsh" response coming from the *Media Dakwah* editorial staffs. *UQ's* edition No. 3, Vol. VI Th. 1995 was specially dedicated to celebrate *"25 Tahun Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam"* (25 years of Islamic renewal movement). When Huntington published his idea on "Clash of Civilizations" in 1993, *UQ* published his article and discussed it with Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. See "Benturan Islam-Barat: Fantasi Intelektual" (Clash of Islam and the West: An Intellectual Fantasy) in *UQ* No. 5, Vol. IV Th. 1993). Edition No. 1, Vol. V, Th. 1994 especially raised postmodern issues and explored how Islam could answer this problem. Edition No. 3 Vol. V, Th. 1994 highlighted the controversial issue of Islamic studies in the East or the West.

28. Due to historical and psychological reasons such as the impact of Muslim-Jew and Muslim-the West conflicts, in Indonesia as well as in other Muslim societies, the words of "yahudi" and "orientalist" are commonly felt to be a curse expressing only a negative connotation.
29. Liddle's article was published in *Ulumul Qur'an* No. 3, Vol. IV 1993 discussing the Islamic renewal movement and scripturalist Muslims in Indonesia. The Islamic renewal movement was associated with the modernist wing and scripturalism was linked to the "fundamentalist" wing of Islam. Liddle's analysis was focused specifically on *Media Dakwah* magazine published by DDII (Indonesian Counsel for Islamic Predication), an organization often associated with conservative Indonesian Muslim.
30. Interview with Dana Iswara, 13 July 1999.

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